Doing Projects Right and Doing the Right Project
I’d like to develop a distinction between two modes of success or failure in infrastructure projects, which I’ve mentioned in brief in past post. An infrastructure project may be done right or wrong – that is, it could be built at a reasonable lifecycle cost and offer high quality of service or it could fail to do this, typically through very high upfront construction costs with no future benefit. But it could also be the right project to build or the wrong one – that is it could be the right priority for the region that builds it based on expected usage and future development or it could be a low priority, typically due to politicization of engineering and planning. Those are distinct judgments, and I’m not even sure they are strongly correlated.
The right project, done wrong
I’ve mentioned in a few past posts as well as videos that New York is for the most part building the right projects right now. Based on any reasonable cost per rider calculation, the highest priorities in the region excluding mainline rail are Second Avenue Subway phases 1 and 2, an extension of phase 2 under 125th Street, subway extensions under Nostrand and Utica Avenues, an orbital line following the Bay Ridge Branch toward Jackson Heights and Yankee Stadium, and a subway extension to LaGuardia Airport. Phase 1 has been built, and the current priorities are phase 2 and the orbital line under the moniker IBX, the latter giving the governor’s personal imprimatur to this important project. The only lower-priority extension built ahead of these is the 7 extension to Hudson Yards, which is a small fraction of the good projects by total cost.
In mainline rail, on the New Jersey side, the biggest priority is the Gateway tunnel and this is indeed what the state and Port Authority are most invested in. Even on the New York side, mainline rail is invested in in roughly the right priority order, especially if one fixes the assumption of bad present-day operations; the only real problem is that due to politics from the late 1990s, the MTA overinvested in New York-side mainline rail (that is, East Side Access) to secure suburban Republican support for Second Avenue Subway phase 1.
The problem for New York is that every single project it touches is executed in almost the worst way possible. It can’t build, and to an extent it doesn’t even want to build. The $50 billion in New York-side capital investment every five years are a large multiple of what peer cities spend, and what this buys is a few kilometers of subway every decade, escalating maintenance costs, and a vague promise to not quite finish making the subway accessible in the 2050s. But the little it does build is, for the most part, the right project.
New York is not the only city in this situation. The prioritization in Toronto seems fine to me, including the Downtown Relief Line rebranded as the Ontario Line, electrification and general modernization of commuter rail as part of the RER project, and rail on Eglinton. London, likewise, seems to be building projects in the right priority order, but it lost its ability to build in the 1980s and 90s so that its urban rail growth rate is roughly one new line per monarch and its step-free access program is proceeding at a slower pace than that of any peer except New York (which can’t build anything) and Paris (which can and does but doesn’t believe in accessibility).
Wrong projects
In contrast with the example of New York or Toronto, there are places where the prioritization is completely out of whack. The best example I can give of is Los Angeles. Like New York and other English-speaking cities, Los Angeles can’t build; unlike New York, it clearly wants to build, and has a large expansion program based on two separate sales tax referenda, with lines programmed through the 2060s due to the extreme construction costs. However, the capital prioritization is just wrong, in several ways:
- The priority list puts low-usage extensions to the suburbs, like the Foothills Extension of the Gold Line and the West Santa Ana Branch, above core lines replacing high-usage buses like South Vermont and connectivity projects like linking Burbank and Pasadena directly.
- The suburban extensions often use the wrong mode or alignment – Los Angeles loves freeway medians for light rail rights-of-way, is building some lines parallel to or even in the right-of-way of commuter rail in lieu of improving Metrolink, and was starting to run into capacity problems on the shared street-running section of the Expo and Blue Lines before corona even on an otherwise low-intensity system.
- There is no transit-oriented development plan – the region is likely the NIMBY capital of the United States, and perhaps the developed world, with large swaths of valuable near-center land that’s about to get subway stations that’s still zoned single-family; in the state legislature, YIMBY bills increasing housing production typically get a large majority of the votes of politicians representing the Bay Area and a small minority of those representing the Los Angeles region.
- Much of the referendum money is not even rail expansion, but road programs, including new freeway lanes.
The upshot is that while New York builds the right projects wrong, Los Angeles builds the wrong projects, besides its issue of very high construction costs.
In reality, most places are on a spectrum, or even evolve from one to the other based on political changes. San Francisco built the almost totally useless Central Subway due to demands by people in Chinatown who don’t even ride public transportation; the line is so short and deep that even ignoring its construction costs, its trip time benefit over the buses it’s replacing is maybe 30 seconds. However, the future projects it wants to build but can’t due to high costs – the Downtown Extension tunnel taking Caltrain from its present near-center terminus to the actual city center and a second BART tube across the Bay with an extension under Geary – are exactly the right priorities, and would have long been built anywhere that could tunnel for $250 million/km and not $1 billion/km.
Boston, likewise, is building the right priorities at the level of what lines are visible on the map, but it has the second of Los Angeles’s four problems in droves. The Green Line Extension should have been commuter rail; the commuter rail electrification project should be all-catenary and not the current plan of a combination of catenary and experimental battery technology; the deelectrification of the trolleybuses was just embarrassing. But the actual alignments – the Green Line Extension, the planned Red-Blue Connector, and the Regional Rail project – are the right priorities, at least.
The wrong project, done right
So far I’ve given American examples of poor construction practices. But there are also examples of places that build effectively but have poor prioritization. My own city, Berlin, is the best example I can think of: its construction costs are pretty average – higher than in Southern Europe, lower than anywhere that uses international English-dominant consultants – but its project prioritization is terrible.
The obviously lowest-cost-per-rider extension, that of U8 to Märkisches Viertel (see some references linked here), has been deprioritized due to bad politicking. The Green Party and the heir to the East German communist party, Die Linke, both oppose subway construction on ideological grounds and prefer trams, the Greens because they associate subway construction with making room on the surface for cars and Die Linke for a combination of being used to East German trams and general wrecker politics. In the outgoing coalition, the pro-subway Social Democrats pushed for the lines that were the most important for its own priorities and those happen to be in Spandau and at the airport rather than Märkisches Viertel; thus, the U8 extension was placed behind those.
As with the American examples in the previous two sections, here we must qualify judgment in that it’s rather common for cities to be on a spectrum. Even Berlin has better project prioritization than Los Angeles: for one, it is not as NIMBY, and the U7 airport extension does come with a transit-oriented development plan.
A more typical example is perhaps Paris. Paris’s project prioritization raises some questions, but there is no obviously low-hanging fruit like U8 that remains unbuilt due to East Germany and 1970s New Left dead-enders. The current expansion plans underrate core capacity, by which I mean separating the RER B and D tunnels, currently shared between Gare du Nord and Châtelet-Les Halles; but such a project would be disruptive if highly beneficial, and another core capacity project, namely the expansion of the RER E through the city to La Défense and western suburbs, is proceeding. The outward expansion of the Métro seems to be largely in line with what the most important priorities are; Grand Paris Express is a mix of good lines, that is Métro Lines 14, 15, and 16, and bad that is Line 17 to the airport and Line 18 linking two rich suburbs with little density in-between.
Moreover, the Paris suburbs, where practically all expansion is done, are fairly YIMBY. Francilien housing production in the late 2010s was 80,000-90,000 a year (in 2019 it was 82,000, or 6.7/1,000 people), with virtually no construction in the city proper – and moreover, the housing built in the suburbs tends to be infill replacing disused industrial land, or else it’s on top of planned Grand Paris Express or RER stations.
Why?
The poor project prioritization in the cities I’ve given the most attention to – Los Angeles but also Berlin and San Francisco and glimpses of Paris and New York – is entirely about politics. As the worst city of the bunch, Los Angeles has illuminating features that we can use to judge the others.
In Southern California, the most significant misfeature is the statewide requirement that all tax increases be approved in a referendum by a two-thirds majority. In San Francisco, the electorate is so left-wing that this hurdle is not hard to clear, and agencies can plan as always. In Los Angeles and San Diego, it is not, and to secure enough votes, agencies have to essentially bribe clientelistic actors with specific lines on a map that those actors will never use but still take credit for. This leads to all of the following misfeatures:
- Ballot propositions that include not just expansion of the rail network but also subsidies to reduced fares for people with local New Left politics who identify politically against state planning, road expansion money for local notables who don’t mind rail expansion but think it’s too political to prioritize rail over cars, and long-term maintenance for unambitious bureaucrats who love spending that isn’t expected to produce concrete results.
- An expansion program that gives each subregion its own line – in Los Angeles, this is the Orange Line BRT for the Valley, the Gold Line for San Gabriel Valley, and so on; the core is a subregion in its own right and can get a project too, like the Regional Connector subway, but it can’t be expected to get too many projects, and interregional connections are less important since the regions they serve already have their lines.
- The planning is haphazard and avoids paradigmatic changes like modernizing the commuter rail system – Los Angeles has some advocates pushing for electrification, like Paul Dyson, and long-term plans to actually do it, but those plans are far behind what Caltrain electrification in the Bay Area (a perfect example of the right project done wrong) and what technical advocates are doing in Philadelphia and Boston.
In effect, a constitutional change intended to prevent California from wasting taxpayer money has had the opposite effect: the two-thirds majority requirement for tax hikes ensures that in Southern California, every petty actor is a veto point and therefore can get extra money. The New Left may comprise 1970s dead-enders trying and failing to reconcile their NIMBYism with the challenges of the 21st century, but it’s the New Right that destroyed the ability of the state to build anything.
With this in mind, we can look at the deviations in Berlin, San Francisco, and New York through the same lens. Berlin lacks any kind of New Right veto point system for investment; a majority in the Abgeordnetenhaus is sufficient, and its typical party of government, SPD, has decently developmental and YIMBY views, hobbled just now by an atypically bad leader and federal headwinds. However, the coalitions it’s in require it to provide sops to either NIMBYs (that is, the Greens) or drivers (that is, CDU). The outgoing all-left coalition deprioritized the U-Bahn to build trams, while the incoming CDU-SPD coalition wants U-Bahns but with park-and-rides and cessation of road diet programs. The difference is that the system in Los Angeles requires agencies to offer sops to both groups at once in addition to others.
One of the other actors, not present in Berlin beyond their influence on CDU, is the local notables. These are typically business owners, who as a constituency drive and overestimate the share of their customers who drive. In the United States (but not France or Germany) they may also trade on an ethnically marked identity, which is usually local and pro-car again since the (say) Chinese-Californians who take the train are usually Downtown San Francisco workers who socialize outside the neighborhood. The Central Subway was specifically a demand of such interests from Chinatown, who had opposed the removal of the Embarcadero Freeway and demanded something that would look like a replacement, and in a way is, in the sense that neither the freeway nor the Central Subway is of any use for urban travel. Here, the difference with drivers as an interest is that drivers want more car infrastructure that feels to them like it makes their trips more convenient, whereas local notables want to be seen extracting money from the city or state to prove to their clients that they are powerful; for the notables, the cost is itself the benefit.
Excessive empowerment of local notables – that is, any empowerment – leads to both poor project prioritization and high costs. I don’t think there’s a high correlation between the two judgments, but it’s telling that the best example I know of of bad prioritization is high-cost Los Angeles, while medium-cost Berlin is much less bad. The other political mechanisms seem independent of costs: a system in which the state and developmental interests are hobbled by NIMBYism or by actors who want to annoy Greta Thunberg will underbuild or build the wrong things, but NIMBYs rarely manage to meaningfully raise costs and were entirely absent from any of the mechanisms we’ve found for high costs in our New York and Boston reports.
Pedestrian Observations 
Maybe as a counter-example of local notables getting involved in the right way. When the Glattalbahn in Zürich was built, Marcel Stoffel, the boss of the shopping mall that was connected using this tram-line contributed 2M to the costs, he later said this was one of his best investments…
Chuo Shinkansen and Texad Central mostly ignoring “local notable” didn’t appears to be particularly impressive either
Texas Central’s main problem is that its owner is used to building viaducts instead of earthworks. The impact of local notables is minor; the more substantial impact is from people motivated by anti-rail political conservatism, thanks to whom the state of Texas has no political space to engage in any kind of coercive coordination to help with land acquisition.
I mean their station site selection, assuming the line is to be completed
My suspicion is that what actually killed Texas Central was the rise in interest rates. Does this make sense?
Considering the total time the project has been tied up in litigation (since 2015 at least) with no positive signs from local and state governments that the project will receive assistance, I would argue that is by far the bigger killer. They had 8 years to convince Texas politicians that the project was a worthwhile pursuit, and just never found a foothold.
Now that is down in large-part to the ongoing ‘modal warfare’ narrative. They would have had to launch a hefty lobbying campaign to overcome standing opposition in the heartland of US oil production and car culture (Houston is an affront to urban planning and their highways are a monument to mankind’s arrogance). But, I would argue the capital flight for the project is due to the prospect of getting the build across the finish line looking slim independent of financing rates. The original project (and the 90’s similar rail proposal) would have been generally not difficult in comparison to other proposed US high-speed rail corridors, and you could keep the capital outlay pretty low if the construction crews had the freedom to cut loose and get it done.
I just don’t understand how a private international investor saying ‘oh we want to give Texas billions of investment dollars’ is not catnip to the GOP. There are other factors at play, and a broader picture that this plays in. But, in comparison to a public project (which the GOP has easy latitude to despise within their platform) killing Texas Central is an awful look for the supposedly ‘pro-business’ wing.
I’m not convinced conservatives care about their pro business wing anymore.
Where would you put Seattle’s projects? There, they have quite a lot of politicking over prioritisation, but at least the debate seems to be well engaged, where mistakes are identified and discussed (if not always acted upon).
ST3 was definitely an LA-style referendum: every region got a line even though travel time will decrease compared to the bus. And no proposals to electrify or significantly improve Sounder South, instead we will build a relatively slow light rail line that roughly parallels it
“However, the future projects it wants to build but can’t due to high costs – the Downtown Extension tunnel taking Caltrain from its present near-center terminus to the actual city center and a second BART tube across the Bay”
What is your opinion of rolling these into one, as proposed here?
And further developed more recently by the same author, Clem Tillier, here: https://caltrain-hsr.blogspot.com/2023/03/the-false-choice-of-link21.html
An example of doing the right project wrong is Calgary‘s greenfield Green line which is built as low floor line despite the entourage legacy system being high floor. A council member on twitter stated that was due to high floor trains are not going to be manufactured anymore… https://twitter.com/gccarra/status/1268373711251402753?s=21 weaponized incompetence
High floor “light” rail with any street running is insane. What year is this, 1970?
Calgary’s doing the right thing.
The only people who go with this nonsense are insane — literally insane, as in San Francisco Bay Area or Los Angeles ¡¡¡insane!!! — or are locked into extensive high-floor historical Stadtbahn
Also, segregated rolling stock (and non-interlined routes) is hardly obviously a bad thing. On the contrary, in a great number of cases.
Having uniform rolling stock is a massive plus Calgary’s mother system in Frankfurt is buying rolling stock for as little as 2 million per 25 meter car due to large volume orders (about 250 cars from 2008)
Oh boy. Someone’d better tell every metro system in the world that they won’t be able to get any trains anymore.
Best to start with all those high-floor German Stadtbahn systems which are buying high-floor trains as if nobody told them about this! HeiterBlick as well as CAF each have three customers in recent years as if they didn’t knew.
Right. But nobody remotely sane would go out and buy such bespoke decades-obsolete designs unless there were extremely compelling sunk costs/installed base/network reasons to do so. Yes, the German Stadtbahnen. No, Calgary. No, San Francisco.
What on earth are you talking about? High-floor trains are the standard in 90% of situations—the only time you would choose to use a low-floor train is if you absolutely have to be running along streets, and don’t want to build up high platforms. Otherwise, the high-floors are much simpler & cheaper to build, and have lower maintenance costs.
I’m talking about exactly what I said I was talking about.
Mark: I believe Richard was talking about “trains” in the sense restricted to “light rail” vehicles, i.e. exactly as you say, the ones you don’t want
to touch with a trolley poleunless you absolutely need to do street-running.The two open questions I see here are: 1) what did the Calgary councilman mean by “trains”, 2) more importantly, whether Calgary should be seeking to buy street-running-capable vehicles for its new line in the first place, since it is mostly grade separated and thus arguably should be seen as (and designed as) a metro line rather than a fast tram.
Calgary only has the C-Train – it doesn’t have any other train service, and I don’t think it has any proposals to introduce mainline rail except for vaporware high-speed rail to Edmonton.
What do u mean high floor lrt is superior in all aspects- faster dwell times door placement, passenger ergonomics, there is literally no advantage low floor trams have over high floor except for a. Ur not in the anglosphere and building low platforms actually saves a proportional significant amount or b. a large legacy tram network with no platforms for all greenfield solutions especially in the US where 4 lane roads are standard high floor is the optimal solution especially for the green line in calgary running underground downtown and the rest along stroads in random suburbs. High floor is worlds ahead in capacity there’s even 100 meter completely walkthrough trainsets in Calgary’s “mother-system” in Frankfurt https://youtu.be/tlfE4EN4aq8
Well said, Basil. To add to that: there’s no law of nature saying that you cannot run metro cars as streetcars as well. It feels like Calgary needlessly limited their choices by declaring that the vehicles must be “light rail,” and then threw their hands up when they couldn’t find any high-floor options… because high-floor cars just aren’t marketed as LRVs anymore. It is not even remotely difficult to find an off-the-shelf railcar that matches Calgary’s existing loading gauge (2.65m is by far the most common width for urban rail cars, and Calgary doesn’t have any weird clearance issues) and platform height (982mm is higher than most systems, but not by a lot). For instance: Copenhagen Metro trains are 2.65m wide & sit 850mm off the rails. Lifting that up to 982mm would not be difficult, and may even be doable by just retuning the existing suspension. And the linear mass density of a CTrain railcar is 20% greater than that of a Copenhagen Metro car, so no concern about the railbed. I believe Hamburg U-Bahn & London deep-tube trains are very similar in both metrics as well, but they aren’t as transparent about platform height as Copenhagen is, so I can’t be as certain.
The savings in capital costs from doing this wouldn’t be immense, (though it’s difficult to estimate with Calgary being so opaque about the bids they received) but the operating costs would be dramatically lower, and the potential to upgrade capacity far higher.
Alon: Calgary has less vapourware-y mainline service Airport-Downtown-Banff floating around
“I’ve mentioned in a few past posts as well as videos that New York is for the most part building the right projects right now. Based on any reasonable cost per rider calculation,…”
IMHO, that’s a poor criterion to use for basing a project’s priority because it ignores existing facilities in the area to be served by the new project. This isn’t a problem in cities that lack existing facilities. It has led to proposals that duplicate existing facilities in already transit rich NYC, while ignoring the 25% of the population that are not within walking distance of such facilities.
Let’s consider Phase 2 of the Second Ave Subway, with stations at 106th, 116th and 125th Streets. 121,000 people live in the census blocks that are within 1/2 mile of the proposed stations. However, 119,000 of them already live in census blocks that are within 1/2 mile of an existing subway station. That’s a net gain of only 2,000 additional residents who will gain walk-to-subway access.
The IBX isn’t much better. 436,000 residents live within 1/2 mile of the stations listed in the RPA’s report. However, 364,000 residents already live within walking distance of an existing subway station. The remaining 72,000 are split between 44,000 in Brooklyn and 27,000 in Queens. Three Brooklyn stations account for 42,000 of the 44,000 increase. These stations are: Utica – Farragut Aves (20,000), Bklyn Terminal Market (18,000) and Rockaway Ave (4,000).
The location of these stations suggests a way to provide 95% of new walk-to-subway access for the Brooklyn section at a much reduced cost. That solution would be to branch off the Canarsie Line at New Lots and extend it along the Bay Ridge right of way to Utica Ave. If cost is a consideration, the Rockaway Ave station could be dropped. Using the existing subway cars would eliminate the IBX’s projected cost for new rolling stock and repair facilities. It would also place IBX within the existing subway fare structure – a discussion that has not been addressed.
IBX largely serves people who are already being served by the subway, but it serves them in an orthogonal direction. This matters, because the areas in question have high transit usage for trips to Manhattan, but not for other trips; the point of IBX is to connect these areas to one another and not just Manhattan.
Let me see, if I understand your argument for avoiding areas where 25% of the population lives.
Priority should be given to building facilities in the low demand orthogonal direction to areas that already have facilities in the high demand longitudinal direction. The priority for these areas should be greater than for areas that lack any facilities.
Is that an accurate synopsis?
If so, it’s a prescription for the least efficient use of resources.
I think with regards to the second avenue subway this is a compelling argument as it’s parallel to the Lexington Avenue line and it isn’t substantially faster like the Elizabeth line or the RER.
That said I think orthogonal lines and faster RER style lines can have a lot of value. Because by that argument the London overground or even the Elizabeth Line are failures as they have all the same flaws. Yet they have 39 million and 62 million passengers respectively in the last quarter.
Second Avenue Subway is different because it relieved overcrowding on the Lexington. Most lines don’t have this need. And while it’s parallel to the Lexington on the UES, it then curves to serve West Midtown, so it’s not exactly parallel overall.
Yeah, don’t sleep on the Upper East Side-Midtown West connection. It manages to noticeably improve the connection between two of Uptown Manhattan’s three busiest job centers, Columbia (#1) and Weill-Cornell (either #2 or #3, I forget; the other one is Mount Sinai) – it was my commute for a year and if phase 1 had existed then I’d have had a 37-minute one-way commute instead of a 50-minute one.
Priority should be given to lines that can realistically expect high ridership relative to cost. The orthogonal direction has lower demand than the radial one but it still has high latent demand, which can be seen in the ridership of parallel buses (B6, B35, B82) – and the speed advantage of IBX over those buses is atypically high because the B6 and B82 are indirect due to the shape of Brooklyn’s street grid while the B35 is unusually slow and I think might be the slowest non-Manhattan bus.
“The orthogonal direction has lower demand than the radial one but it still has high latent demand, which can be seen in the ridership of parallel buses (B6, B35, B82) ”
IMHO, one needs to provide more specificity how accurately bus ridership would provide “latent” demand for a particular rail proposal. How close are the bus routes to the proposed rail route, so that their ridership might be construed as “latent” demand.
The B35, the Church Ave trolley of bygone days, lies more than 1/2 mile from the IBX. Counting its ridership as “latent” demand for the IBX might be a stretch.
The B82 serves populous areas like Starrett City that lack walk-to-subway access. Moreover, these areas also lie beyond the IBX. One should not count these and similar bus-to-subway riders as part of the “latent” demand for travel between existing subway stops.
The B6 lies within 1/4 mile of the IBX from Rockaway Pkwy to Ocean Pkwy. Its ridership east of Rockaway Pkwy and southwest of Ocean Pkwy should not be included in any “latent” demand without further examination.
In the late 1990s, some people at RPA went ahead and actually computed which origin-destination work trips would be served by the then-larger Triboro RX idea, and got to 76,000 people, i.e. 152,000 weekday work trips, with 64,000 out of the 152,000 diverted from other modes. This is because, as one of just two circumferentials and the only one of the two with proper transfers, the line would concentrate a lot of individually thin travel markets together, some more direct like East New York to Astoria and many relying on new transfers like Ozone Park to Brooklyn College, or Canarsie to Forest Hills – see some visualization here.
The current buses in Brooklyn just illustrate how much latent circumferential demand there is. It’s not really about Starrett City – not only do all buses run nearly the entire route with no rush hour Starrett City-Canarsie service, but also the B6 literally runs parallel except turning at Canarsie from the west without onward service to Starrett City. Then there’s Queens, where there are no good streets for such service, so that routes like the Q58 have to meander, which reduces their effectiveness, and yet still get high ridership.
“Second Avenue Subway is different because it relieved overcrowding on the Lexington.”
One way to create overcrowding is to operate an insufficient number of trains.
If one looks at the MTA’s DEIS for the SAS. The leave load levels were calculated on the basis of 28 tph on the express and 24 tph on the local. If one looks at the service the TA reported in 1954, it was 33 tph on the express and 30 tph on the local. If these service levels were used for the passenger counts provided in the DEIS, the leave load levels would have been below 1.0, i.e. no overcrowding.
I think you need to look at the facts more before generalizing. With regard to sales tax measures, you claim that, “In San Francisco, the electorate is so left-wing that this hurdle is not hard to clear, and agencies can plan as always.”
Last year, in 2022, Proposition A, which was to fund SF Muni, failed: https://www.sfmta.com/projects/prop-a-muni-reliability-and-street-safety-bond
Proposition L passed, but the percentage for roads and highways (18.9%) is higher than the percentage for roads/highways in LA’s Measure M (17%).
This also needs to be squared away with the fact that Los Angeles has passed multiple sales tax measures funding LA Metro (so it is funded by a 2% sales tax charge), while the Bay Area counties generally only have 0.5% or 1% from sales tax. When the Bay Area passed Measure RR in 2020, it passed with a thinner margin than Measure M in Los Angeles, even though it was just a 0.125% sales tax compared to Measure M’s 0.5% sales tax. The Bay Area also been mulling a 1% sales tax measure for over half a decade without pulling the trigger on it partly because the polling was less than certain (the fact that a 0.125% sales tax almost failed does not give hopes that a larger 1% rate will pass).
You claim that “YIMBY bills increasing housing production typically get a large majority of the votes of politicians representing the Bay Area and a small minority of those representing the Los Angeles region.” I think any analysis of YIMBY bills will show that that is very incorrect. Even simple mathematical odds will disprove it since the LA region represents 60% of California’s population while the Bay Area represents less than 20% of California’s population.
Take a look at the cayimby.org website and look at the assembly votes for any of the bills cited as legislative successes:
2019 AB 68 (legalize ADUs): Yes votes from Bay Area: 14 Yes Votes from LA: 23
2020 AB 725 (fourplex zoning): Yes votes from Bay Area: 12 Yes Votes from LA: 20
2021 SB 10 (upzoning near transit): Yes votes from Bay Area: 12 Yes Votes from LA: 15
2022 AB 2097 (no parking requirements near transit): Yes votes from Bay Area: 12 Yes Votes from LA: 22
And no, the LA votes do not represent a minority of the politicians representing the LA region.
SB 50 got a majority of the State Senate votes from NorCal and failed due to opposition from LA-area politicians; the demographic dominance of SoCal means that yes, the watered down bills that do pass have to get some LA-area buy-in, in the same way Democrats running winning national campaigns get a majority (or by now near-majority) of their votes from white people.
And the LA and SF measures are both designed to clear two-thirds, so the margins don’t matter as much as what it takes to get there. In LA, they involve the one-line-per-subregion system to get the petty actors to sign off; in the Bay Area, they don’t, to the point that BART felt free to cancel the Livermore extension. The San Jose subway is a bad project that’s being built but that’s San Jose chasing pizzazz, not the Bay Area needing to bribe it to get other things done.
SB 50 was one bill 4 years ago and did not make it to an assembly vote. Most of the bills from 2020-2022 incorporate many of SB 50 provisions. If you are talking about how YIMBY bills “typically” are treated you need to find more examples instead of 2019’s SB 50.
I pointed out Proposition A, which failed to pass (by failing to get 2/3rds) and was a solely San Francisco measure to fund SFMTA. Proposition L received 2/3 and was also San Francisco only and 18.9% for roads/freeways. Measure RR was a ballot initiative in San Francisco, San Mateo and Santa Clara counties. The Faster Bay Area initiative is not San Jose chasing pizzazz, it has been workshopped for the past decade and isn’t just for San Jose projects, it is supposed to be a 9-county initiative. Each county sent a wishlist for projects to be on the list (Example: Marin County: https://www.marinij.com/2019/12/08/marin-submits-transportation-wish-list-for-mega-tax-measure/)
Given that the Bay Area struggles to get more than a 1% sales tax rate for transit (and typically it is less than 1%), and they have been workshopping for the past half-decade trying to put a ballot measure together to match LA’s transit sales tax rate, I don’t buy the claim that it is an easier hurdle for the Bay Area to get transit sales taxes funded versus in LA.
“In the late 1990s, some people at RPA went ahead and actually computed which origin-destination work trips would be served by the then-larger Triboro RX idea, and got to 76,000 people, i.e. 152,000 weekday work trips, with 64,000 out of the 152,000 diverted from other modes… – see some visualization here.”
The RPA revised their estimate to 100,000 riders in their 2016 report: https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/rpa-org/pdfs/RPA-The-Triboro-Transit-for-the-Boroughs-1.pdf. They did not provide any justification for their figure.
Thank you for your 1996 reference. Unfortunately, the links to the promised detailed analysis are broken.
There would be a problem, even if the analysis were spot on. The model is based on the 1996 census bureau journey-to-work data, which records the journeys by census tract to census tract.
My own studies concluded that more precision is needed for determining walk-to-subway distances. The census tract data is just to crude to get accurate measures. Census block to census block data did not become available until the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data was released, starting in 2002.
My own modelling assigns a potential user to workers who live more than 1 mile from their workplace and with the last mile/first mile distances to be each less than 1/2 mile. I cannot provide the number right now. I remember it was much less than the 76K figure cited in the reference. It was also much less than the number of people who lived within walking distance of an IBX stop and worked in Manhattan.
How many total trips a year is 100,000 workday trips? ~24 million annual trips plus maybe 50% for leisure?
Yeah, Frumin’s blog has link-rotted, and Frumin himself moved on to data analysis for alternative transportation in general (although I could try asking him for the model).
The 100,000 figure is for a different project; the estimate for IBX is even lower, since it’s a smaller project with no connection to the Bronx (or Astoria). For what it’s worth, Frumin says that the model, used by Jeff Zupan, was the same as that of the MTA, and Second Avenue Subway was on track to meeting ridership projections on the eve of corona.
I’m not sure a more granular analysis would weaken Triboro/IBX. I guess the main mechanism is that granular analysis is good at capturing how spiky demand is around station sites, and at residential level, there isn’t any development facing the IBX right-of-way the way there is facing streets that the subway runs on. But then there’s a lot of granular destination-end stuff, namely Brooklyn College and the growing Indian ethnic business center in Jackson Heights.
FWIW, Frumin has an easier task justifying active transportation than you do justifying IBX. :=)
I studied the SAS turnstile data when it opened in Jan 2017. That data is still available, so a retrospective analysis is possible. The exit data is unreliable because people using the exit gates are not recorded. If we are to believe the MTA’s fare evasion press releases, the entry data isn’t much better.
I don’t know whether this html table data will work. I’ll repost it as csv text, that can be pasted into a spreadsheet, if it doesn’t. There has been fairly large growth along IBX between the 2010 and 2020 census. It isn’t in Jackson Heights nor Brooklyn College.
itemsc2020n2020c2010n2010c2000n2000Combined: Brooklyn; Queens- Population5,141,5384,735,4224,694,705- Walker Population3,520,4203,592,0153,232,2613,298,3403,188,8253,256,667- Pct Walker Population68.569.968.369.767.969.4- Walker Population Increase71,59566,07967,842- Pct Walker Population Increase2.02.02.1- Mean Distance To Subway0.6250.6110.6300.6170.6350.622- Median Distance To Subway0.3020.2960.3030.2970.3070.300Brooklyn- Population2,736,0742,504,7002,465,326- Walker Population2,306,2192,350,5252,102,6892,144,6622,059,3892,104,618- Pct Walker Population84.385.983.985.683.585.4- Walker Population Increase44,30641,97345,229- Pct Walker Population Increase1.92.02.2- Mean Distance To Subway0.3290.3120.3320.3140.3350.316- Median Distance To Subway0.2330.2310.2330.2320.2340.233Queens- Population2,405,4642,230,7222,229,379- Walker Population1,214,2011,241,4901,129,5721,153,6781,129,4361,152,049- Pct Walker Population50.551.650.651.750.751.7- Walker Population Increase27,28924,10622,613- Pct Walker Population Increase2.22.12.0- Mean Distance To Subway0.9600.9520.9640.9560.9680.960- Median Distance To Subway0.4910.4790.4910.4790.4910.478Walking Distance Area To Proposal Stops- Population435,982406,243400,203- Walker Population364,387435,982340,164406,243332,361400,203- Pct Walker Population83.6100.083.7100.083.0100.0- Walker Population Increase71,59566,07967,842- Pct Walker Population Increase19.619.420.4- Mean Distance To Subway0.3110.2230.3110.2240.3160.225- Median Distance To Subway0.2190.2060.2190.2070.2190.208Individual Proposal Stops – Alphabetical OrderBrooklyn Army Terminal IBX- Population28,45226,94827,015- Walker Population26,58328,45225,33626,94825,22127,015- Pct Walker Population93.4100.094.0100.093.4100.0- Walker Population Increase1,8691,6121,794- Pct Walker Population Increase7.06.47.1- Mean Distance To Subway0.2020.1710.2000.1700.2040.171- Median Distance To Subway0.1660.1220.1660.1220.1970.122Brooklyn College IBX- Population33,83033,93436,289- Walker Population33,83033,83033,93433,93436,28936,289- Pct Walker Population100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0- Walker Population Increase000- Pct Walker Population Increase0.00.00.0- Mean Distance To Subway0.2340.2170.2370.2190.2360.218- Median Distance To Subway0.2180.2120.2190.2130.2190.212Brooklyn Terminal Market IBX- Population19,20917,90719,023- Walker Population1,08619,2091,00017,9071,05219,023- Pct Walker Population5.7100.05.6100.05.5100.0- Walker Population Increase18,12316,90717,971- Pct Walker Population Increase1668.81690.71708.3- Mean Distance To Subway0.8530.3670.8570.3680.8600.367- Median Distance To Subway0.8540.3960.8560.3950.8650.395East New York IBX- Population25,34620,34418,825- Walker Population25,34625,34620,34420,34418,82518,825- Pct Walker Population100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0- Walker Population Increase000- Pct Walker Population Increase0.00.00.0- Mean Distance To Subway0.1830.1830.1920.1920.1960.195- Median Distance To Subway0.1770.1770.1880.1880.1880.188Grand Ave – 79th St IBX- Population24,36020,45118,576- Walker Population9,84224,3607,56320,4516,40918,576- Pct Walker Population40.4100.037.0100.034.5100.0- Walker Population Increase14,51812,88812,167- Pct Walker Population Increase147.5170.4189.8- Mean Distance To Subway0.6190.3040.6350.3080.6460.312- Median Distance To Subway0.6580.2850.6760.2940.6980.313Jackson Heights IBX- Population53,41251,28752,330- Walker Population53,41253,41251,28751,28752,33052,330- Pct Walker Population100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0- Walker Population Increase000- Pct Walker Population Increase0.00.00.0- Mean Distance To Subway0.1690.1690.1710.1710.1720.171- Median Distance To Subway0.1620.1620.1630.1630.1590.159Livonia Ave IBX- Population39,27036,76835,925- Walker Population39,27039,27036,76836,76835,92535,925- Pct Walker Population100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0- Walker Population Increase000- Pct Walker Population Increase0.00.00.0- Mean Distance To Subway0.1630.1630.1660.1660.1650.165- Median Distance To Subway0.1600.1600.1600.1600.1700.170McDonald Ave IBX- Population35,37533,53032,423- Walker Population35,37535,37533,53033,53032,42332,423- Pct Walker Population100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0- Walker Population Increase000- Pct Walker Population Increase0.00.00.0- Mean Distance To Subway0.2210.2210.2200.2200.2230.223- Median Distance To Subway0.2020.2000.2030.2030.2040.204Metropolitan Ave IBX- Population11,40210,3619,860- Walker Population10,44111,4029,54510,3619,0489,860- Pct Walker Population91.6100.092.1100.091.8100.0- Walker Population Increase961816812- Pct Walker Population Increase9.28.59.0- Mean Distance To Subway0.3330.3190.3330.3180.3280.313- Median Distance To Subway0.3590.3300.3500.3280.3480.313Myrtle Ave IBX- Population33,37832,32232,035- Walker Population26,46533,37825,90132,32225,77632,035- Pct Walker Population79.3100.080.1100.080.5100.0- Walker Population Increase6,9136,4216,259- Pct Walker Population Increase26.124.824.3- Mean Distance To Subway0.3300.2270.3250.2270.3230.225- Median Distance To Subway0.3230.2120.3180.2120.3160.212New Utrecht Ave – 62nd St IBX- Population42,88538,71335,987- Walker Population42,88542,88538,71338,71335,98735,987- Pct Walker Population100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0- Walker Population Increase000- Pct Walker Population Increase0.00.00.0- Mean Distance To Subway0.1880.1870.1890.1880.1880.187- Median Distance To Subway0.1770.1770.1770.1770.1790.179Queens Blvd IBX- Population23,10322,02620,777- Walker Population18,20623,10318,04522,02617,40220,777- Pct Walker Population78.8100.081.9100.083.8100.0- Walker Population Increase4,8973,9813,375- Pct Walker Population Increase26.922.119.4- Mean Distance To Subway0.3180.2150.2980.2090.2880.205- Median Distance To Subway0.2770.1970.2350.1910.2260.191Rockaway Ave – Ave D IBX- Population20,18418,29618,283- Walker Population15,71820,18413,37318,29613,09718,283- Pct Walker Population77.9100.073.1100.071.6100.0- Walker Population Increase4,4664,9235,186- Pct Walker Population Increase28.436.839.6- Mean Distance To Subway0.3820.2950.3850.2960.3910.297- Median Distance To Subway0.3800.2970.3800.2990.3800.295Utica Ave – Farragut Rd IBX- Population19,84818,53120,278- Walker Population019,848018,531020,278- Pct Walker Population0.0100.00.0100.00.0100.0- Walker Population Increase19,84818,53120,278- Pct Walker Population Increaseinfinfinf- Mean Distance To Subway0.9830.3560.9850.3620.9790.362- Median Distance To Subway0.9860.3700.9860.3750.9830.375Wilson Ave IBX- Population25,92824,82522,577- Walker Population25,92825,92824,82524,82522,57722,577- Pct Walker Population100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0- Walker Population Increase000- Pct Walker Population Increase0.00.00.0- Mean Distance To Subway0.2050.2050.2090.2090.2100.210- Median Distance To Subway0.1970.1970.1970.1970.2000.200Descending Order by Walker IncreaseUtica Ave – Farragut Rd IBX19,84818,53120,278Brooklyn Terminal Market IBX18,12316,90717,971Grand Ave – 79th St IBX14,51812,88812,167Myrtle Ave IBX6,9136,4216,259Queens Blvd IBX4,8973,9813,375Rockaway Ave – Ave D IBX4,4664,9235,186Brooklyn Army Terminal IBX1,8691,6121,794Metropolitan Ave IBX961816812Brooklyn College IBX000East New York IBX000Jackson Heights IBX000Livonia Ave IBX000McDonald Ave IBX000New Utrecht Ave – 62nd St IBX000Wilson Ave IBX000
The html did not work. Here is csv that can be pasted into a spreadsheet.
,items,c2020,n2020,c2010,n2010,c2000,n2000
0,Combined: Brooklyn; Queens, , , , , ,
1,- Population,”5,141,538″, ,”4,735,422″, ,”4,694,705″,
2,- Walker Population,”3,520,420″,”3,592,015″,”3,232,261″,”3,298,340″,”3,188,825″,”3,256,667″
3,- Pct Walker Population,68.5,69.9,68.3,69.7,67.9,69.4
4,- Walker Population Increase, ,”71,595″, ,”66,079″, ,”67,842″
5,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,2.0, ,2.0, ,2.1
6,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.625,0.611,0.630,0.617,0.635,0.622
7,- Median Distance To Subway,0.302,0.296,0.303,0.297,0.307,0.300
8,Brooklyn, , , , , ,
9,- Population,”2,736,074″, ,”2,504,700″, ,”2,465,326″,
10,- Walker Population,”2,306,219″,”2,350,525″,”2,102,689″,”2,144,662″,”2,059,389″,”2,104,618″
11,- Pct Walker Population,84.3,85.9,83.9,85.6,83.5,85.4
12,- Walker Population Increase, ,”44,306″, ,”41,973″, ,”45,229″
13,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,1.9, ,2.0, ,2.2
14,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.329,0.312,0.332,0.314,0.335,0.316
15,- Median Distance To Subway,0.233,0.231,0.233,0.232,0.234,0.233
16,Queens, , , , , ,
17,- Population,”2,405,464″, ,”2,230,722″, ,”2,229,379″,
18,- Walker Population,”1,214,201″,”1,241,490″,”1,129,572″,”1,153,678″,”1,129,436″,”1,152,049″
19,- Pct Walker Population,50.5,51.6,50.6,51.7,50.7,51.7
20,- Walker Population Increase, ,”27,289″, ,”24,106″, ,”22,613″
21,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,2.2, ,2.1, ,2.0
22,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.960,0.952,0.964,0.956,0.968,0.960
23,- Median Distance To Subway,0.491,0.479,0.491,0.479,0.491,0.478
24,Walking Distance Area To Proposal Stops, , , , , ,
25,- Population,”435,982″, ,”406,243″, ,”400,203″,
26,- Walker Population,”364,387″,”435,982″,”340,164″,”406,243″,”332,361″,”400,203″
27,- Pct Walker Population,83.6,100.0,83.7,100.0,83.0,100.0
28,- Walker Population Increase, ,”71,595″, ,”66,079″, ,”67,842″
29,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,19.6, ,19.4, ,20.4
30,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.311,0.223,0.311,0.224,0.316,0.225
31,- Median Distance To Subway,0.219,0.206,0.219,0.207,0.219,0.208
32, , , , , , ,
33,Individual Proposal Stops – Alphabetical Order, , , , , ,
34, , , , , , ,
35,Brooklyn Army Terminal IBX, , , , , ,
36,- Population,”28,452″, ,”26,948″, ,”27,015″,
37,- Walker Population,”26,583″,”28,452″,”25,336″,”26,948″,”25,221″,”27,015″
38,- Pct Walker Population,93.4,100.0,94.0,100.0,93.4,100.0
39,- Walker Population Increase, ,”1,869″, ,”1,612″, ,”1,794″
40,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,7.0, ,6.4, ,7.1
41,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.202,0.171,0.200,0.170,0.204,0.171
42,- Median Distance To Subway,0.166,0.122,0.166,0.122,0.197,0.122
43, , , , , , ,
44,Brooklyn College IBX, , , , , ,
45,- Population,”33,830″, ,”33,934″, ,”36,289″,
46,- Walker Population,”33,830″,”33,830″,”33,934″,”33,934″,”36,289″,”36,289″
47,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
48,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
49,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
50,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.234,0.217,0.237,0.219,0.236,0.218
51,- Median Distance To Subway,0.218,0.212,0.219,0.213,0.219,0.212
52, , , , , , ,
53,Brooklyn Terminal Market IBX, , , , , ,
54,- Population,”19,209″, ,”17,907″, ,”19,023″,
55,- Walker Population,”1,086″,”19,209″,”1,000″,”17,907″,”1,052″,”19,023″
56,- Pct Walker Population,5.7,100.0,5.6,100.0,5.5,100.0
57,- Walker Population Increase, ,”18,123″, ,”16,907″, ,”17,971″
58,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,1668.8, ,1690.7, ,1708.3
59,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.853,0.367,0.857,0.368,0.860,0.367
60,- Median Distance To Subway,0.854,0.396,0.856,0.395,0.865,0.395
61, , , , , , ,
62,East New York IBX, , , , , ,
63,- Population,”25,346″, ,”20,344″, ,”18,825″,
64,- Walker Population,”25,346″,”25,346″,”20,344″,”20,344″,”18,825″,”18,825″
65,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
66,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
67,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
68,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.183,0.183,0.192,0.192,0.196,0.195
69,- Median Distance To Subway,0.177,0.177,0.188,0.188,0.188,0.188
70, , , , , , ,
71,Grand Ave – 79th St IBX, , , , , ,
72,- Population,”24,360″, ,”20,451″, ,”18,576″,
73,- Walker Population,”9,842″,”24,360″,”7,563″,”20,451″,”6,409″,”18,576″
74,- Pct Walker Population,40.4,100.0,37.0,100.0,34.5,100.0
75,- Walker Population Increase, ,”14,518″, ,”12,888″, ,”12,167″
76,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,147.5, ,170.4, ,189.8
77,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.619,0.304,0.635,0.308,0.646,0.312
78,- Median Distance To Subway,0.658,0.285,0.676,0.294,0.698,0.313
79, , , , , , ,
80,Jackson Heights IBX, , , , , ,
81,- Population,”53,412″, ,”51,287″, ,”52,330″,
82,- Walker Population,”53,412″,”53,412″,”51,287″,”51,287″,”52,330″,”52,330″
83,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
84,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
85,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
86,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.169,0.169,0.171,0.171,0.172,0.171
87,- Median Distance To Subway,0.162,0.162,0.163,0.163,0.159,0.159
88, , , , , , ,
89,Livonia Ave IBX, , , , , ,
90,- Population,”39,270″, ,”36,768″, ,”35,925″,
91,- Walker Population,”39,270″,”39,270″,”36,768″,”36,768″,”35,925″,”35,925″
92,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
93,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
94,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
95,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.163,0.163,0.166,0.166,0.165,0.165
96,- Median Distance To Subway,0.160,0.160,0.160,0.160,0.170,0.170
97, , , , , , ,
98,McDonald Ave IBX, , , , , ,
99,- Population,”35,375″, ,”33,530″, ,”32,423″,
100,- Walker Population,”35,375″,”35,375″,”33,530″,”33,530″,”32,423″,”32,423″
101,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
102,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
103,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
104,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.221,0.221,0.220,0.220,0.223,0.223
105,- Median Distance To Subway,0.202,0.200,0.203,0.203,0.204,0.204
106, , , , , , ,
107,Metropolitan Ave IBX, , , , , ,
108,- Population,”11,402″, ,”10,361″, ,”9,860″,
109,- Walker Population,”10,441″,”11,402″,”9,545″,”10,361″,”9,048″,”9,860″
110,- Pct Walker Population,91.6,100.0,92.1,100.0,91.8,100.0
111,- Walker Population Increase, ,961, ,816, ,812
112,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,9.2, ,8.5, ,9.0
113,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.333,0.319,0.333,0.318,0.328,0.313
114,- Median Distance To Subway,0.359,0.330,0.350,0.328,0.348,0.313
115, , , , , , ,
116,Myrtle Ave IBX, , , , , ,
117,- Population,”33,378″, ,”32,322″, ,”32,035″,
118,- Walker Population,”26,465″,”33,378″,”25,901″,”32,322″,”25,776″,”32,035″
119,- Pct Walker Population,79.3,100.0,80.1,100.0,80.5,100.0
120,- Walker Population Increase, ,”6,913″, ,”6,421″, ,”6,259″
121,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,26.1, ,24.8, ,24.3
122,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.330,0.227,0.325,0.227,0.323,0.225
123,- Median Distance To Subway,0.323,0.212,0.318,0.212,0.316,0.212
124, , , , , , ,
125,New Utrecht Ave – 62nd St IBX, , , , , ,
126,- Population,”42,885″, ,”38,713″, ,”35,987″,
127,- Walker Population,”42,885″,”42,885″,”38,713″,”38,713″,”35,987″,”35,987″
128,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
129,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
130,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
131,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.188,0.187,0.189,0.188,0.188,0.187
132,- Median Distance To Subway,0.177,0.177,0.177,0.177,0.179,0.179
133, , , , , , ,
134,Queens Blvd IBX, , , , , ,
135,- Population,”23,103″, ,”22,026″, ,”20,777″,
136,- Walker Population,”18,206″,”23,103″,”18,045″,”22,026″,”17,402″,”20,777″
137,- Pct Walker Population,78.8,100.0,81.9,100.0,83.8,100.0
138,- Walker Population Increase, ,”4,897″, ,”3,981″, ,”3,375″
139,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,26.9, ,22.1, ,19.4
140,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.318,0.215,0.298,0.209,0.288,0.205
141,- Median Distance To Subway,0.277,0.197,0.235,0.191,0.226,0.191
142, , , , , , ,
143,Rockaway Ave – Ave D IBX, , , , , ,
144,- Population,”20,184″, ,”18,296″, ,”18,283″,
145,- Walker Population,”15,718″,”20,184″,”13,373″,”18,296″,”13,097″,”18,283″
146,- Pct Walker Population,77.9,100.0,73.1,100.0,71.6,100.0
147,- Walker Population Increase, ,”4,466″, ,”4,923″, ,”5,186″
148,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,28.4, ,36.8, ,39.6
149,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.382,0.295,0.385,0.296,0.391,0.297
150,- Median Distance To Subway,0.380,0.297,0.380,0.299,0.380,0.295
151, , , , , , ,
152,Utica Ave – Farragut Rd IBX, , , , , ,
153,- Population,”19,848″, ,”18,531″, ,”20,278″,
154,- Walker Population,0,”19,848″,0,”18,531″,0,”20,278″
155,- Pct Walker Population,0.0,100.0,0.0,100.0,0.0,100.0
156,- Walker Population Increase, ,”19,848″, ,”18,531″, ,”20,278″
157,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,inf, ,inf, ,inf
158,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.983,0.356,0.985,0.362,0.979,0.362
159,- Median Distance To Subway,0.986,0.370,0.986,0.375,0.983,0.375
160, , , , , , ,
161,Wilson Ave IBX, , , , , ,
162,- Population,”25,928″, ,”24,825″, ,”22,577″,
163,- Walker Population,”25,928″,”25,928″,”24,825″,”24,825″,”22,577″,”22,577″
164,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
165,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
166,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
167,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.205,0.205,0.209,0.209,0.210,0.210
168,- Median Distance To Subway,0.197,0.197,0.197,0.197,0.200,0.200
0, , , , , , ,
1,Descending Order by Walker Increase, , , , , ,
2,Utica Ave – Farragut Rd IBX, ,”19,848″, ,”18,531″, ,”20,278″
3,Brooklyn Terminal Market IBX, ,”18,123″, ,”16,907″, ,”17,971″
4,Grand Ave – 79th St IBX, ,”14,518″, ,”12,888″, ,”12,167″
5,Myrtle Ave IBX, ,”6,913″, ,”6,421″, ,”6,259″
6,Queens Blvd IBX, ,”4,897″, ,”3,981″, ,”3,375″
7,Rockaway Ave – Ave D IBX, ,”4,466″, ,”4,923″, ,”5,186″
8,Brooklyn Army Terminal IBX, ,”1,869″, ,”1,612″, ,”1,794″
9,Metropolitan Ave IBX, ,961, ,816, ,812
10,Brooklyn College IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
11,East New York IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
12,Jackson Heights IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
13,Livonia Ave IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
14,McDonald Ave IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
15,New Utrecht Ave – 62nd St IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
16,Wilson Ave IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
The fare evasion press releases are hogwash. The supposed problem is that bus drivers let passengers on without paying in areas where (less likely) they are afraid of crime or (more likely) they know all the passengers are connecting from the subway anyway so what’s the point. The fare evasion numbers on the subway are not especially high.
No bus should have on board fare payment as the normal. It takes too long for people to fumble for their wallet: seconds count! Either some form of off board payment (tricky to pull off: many bus stops are rarely used and so off board payment machines cost more than they will ever generate), or some sort of pass with random checks. Sure you can do on board payment for the rare person who didn’t plan on taking transit but did at the last minute, but it shouldn’t be normal.
Details count. 3 year olds ride transit for the sake of the ride. Once in a while “old men” will do so. Your transit system exists not for them, but for people who have places to be and who are probably running late, so you need to get them there ASAP.
The table html did not work. Here is the csv that can be pasted into a spreadsheet
,items,c2020,n2020,c2010,n2010,c2000,n2000
0,Combined: Brooklyn; Queens, , , , , ,
1,- Population,”5,141,538″, ,”4,735,422″, ,”4,694,705″,
2,- Walker Population,”3,520,420″,”3,592,015″,”3,232,261″,”3,298,340″,”3,188,825″,”3,256,667″
3,- Pct Walker Population,68.5,69.9,68.3,69.7,67.9,69.4
4,- Walker Population Increase, ,”71,595″, ,”66,079″, ,”67,842″
5,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,2.0, ,2.0, ,2.1
6,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.625,0.611,0.630,0.617,0.635,0.622
7,- Median Distance To Subway,0.302,0.296,0.303,0.297,0.307,0.300
8,Brooklyn, , , , , ,
9,- Population,”2,736,074″, ,”2,504,700″, ,”2,465,326″,
10,- Walker Population,”2,306,219″,”2,350,525″,”2,102,689″,”2,144,662″,”2,059,389″,”2,104,618″
11,- Pct Walker Population,84.3,85.9,83.9,85.6,83.5,85.4
12,- Walker Population Increase, ,”44,306″, ,”41,973″, ,”45,229″
13,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,1.9, ,2.0, ,2.2
14,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.329,0.312,0.332,0.314,0.335,0.316
15,- Median Distance To Subway,0.233,0.231,0.233,0.232,0.234,0.233
16,Queens, , , , , ,
17,- Population,”2,405,464″, ,”2,230,722″, ,”2,229,379″,
18,- Walker Population,”1,214,201″,”1,241,490″,”1,129,572″,”1,153,678″,”1,129,436″,”1,152,049″
19,- Pct Walker Population,50.5,51.6,50.6,51.7,50.7,51.7
20,- Walker Population Increase, ,”27,289″, ,”24,106″, ,”22,613″
21,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,2.2, ,2.1, ,2.0
22,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.960,0.952,0.964,0.956,0.968,0.960
23,- Median Distance To Subway,0.491,0.479,0.491,0.479,0.491,0.478
24,Walking Distance Area To Proposal Stops, , , , , ,
25,- Population,”435,982″, ,”406,243″, ,”400,203″,
26,- Walker Population,”364,387″,”435,982″,”340,164″,”406,243″,”332,361″,”400,203″
27,- Pct Walker Population,83.6,100.0,83.7,100.0,83.0,100.0
28,- Walker Population Increase, ,”71,595″, ,”66,079″, ,”67,842″
29,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,19.6, ,19.4, ,20.4
30,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.311,0.223,0.311,0.224,0.316,0.225
31,- Median Distance To Subway,0.219,0.206,0.219,0.207,0.219,0.208
32, , , , , , ,
33,Individual Proposal Stops – Alphabetical Order, , , , , ,
34, , , , , , ,
35,Brooklyn Army Terminal IBX, , , , , ,
36,- Population,”28,452″, ,”26,948″, ,”27,015″,
37,- Walker Population,”26,583″,”28,452″,”25,336″,”26,948″,”25,221″,”27,015″
38,- Pct Walker Population,93.4,100.0,94.0,100.0,93.4,100.0
39,- Walker Population Increase, ,”1,869″, ,”1,612″, ,”1,794″
40,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,7.0, ,6.4, ,7.1
41,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.202,0.171,0.200,0.170,0.204,0.171
42,- Median Distance To Subway,0.166,0.122,0.166,0.122,0.197,0.122
43, , , , , , ,
44,Brooklyn College IBX, , , , , ,
45,- Population,”33,830″, ,”33,934″, ,”36,289″,
46,- Walker Population,”33,830″,”33,830″,”33,934″,”33,934″,”36,289″,”36,289″
47,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
48,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
49,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
50,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.234,0.217,0.237,0.219,0.236,0.218
51,- Median Distance To Subway,0.218,0.212,0.219,0.213,0.219,0.212
52, , , , , , ,
53,Brooklyn Terminal Market IBX, , , , , ,
54,- Population,”19,209″, ,”17,907″, ,”19,023″,
55,- Walker Population,”1,086″,”19,209″,”1,000″,”17,907″,”1,052″,”19,023″
56,- Pct Walker Population,5.7,100.0,5.6,100.0,5.5,100.0
57,- Walker Population Increase, ,”18,123″, ,”16,907″, ,”17,971″
58,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,1668.8, ,1690.7, ,1708.3
59,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.853,0.367,0.857,0.368,0.860,0.367
60,- Median Distance To Subway,0.854,0.396,0.856,0.395,0.865,0.395
61, , , , , , ,
62,East New York IBX, , , , , ,
63,- Population,”25,346″, ,”20,344″, ,”18,825″,
64,- Walker Population,”25,346″,”25,346″,”20,344″,”20,344″,”18,825″,”18,825″
65,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
66,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
67,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
68,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.183,0.183,0.192,0.192,0.196,0.195
69,- Median Distance To Subway,0.177,0.177,0.188,0.188,0.188,0.188
70, , , , , , ,
71,Grand Ave – 79th St IBX, , , , , ,
72,- Population,”24,360″, ,”20,451″, ,”18,576″,
73,- Walker Population,”9,842″,”24,360″,”7,563″,”20,451″,”6,409″,”18,576″
74,- Pct Walker Population,40.4,100.0,37.0,100.0,34.5,100.0
75,- Walker Population Increase, ,”14,518″, ,”12,888″, ,”12,167″
76,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,147.5, ,170.4, ,189.8
77,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.619,0.304,0.635,0.308,0.646,0.312
78,- Median Distance To Subway,0.658,0.285,0.676,0.294,0.698,0.313
79, , , , , , ,
80,Jackson Heights IBX, , , , , ,
81,- Population,”53,412″, ,”51,287″, ,”52,330″,
82,- Walker Population,”53,412″,”53,412″,”51,287″,”51,287″,”52,330″,”52,330″
83,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
84,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
85,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
86,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.169,0.169,0.171,0.171,0.172,0.171
87,- Median Distance To Subway,0.162,0.162,0.163,0.163,0.159,0.159
88, , , , , , ,
89,Livonia Ave IBX, , , , , ,
90,- Population,”39,270″, ,”36,768″, ,”35,925″,
91,- Walker Population,”39,270″,”39,270″,”36,768″,”36,768″,”35,925″,”35,925″
92,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
93,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
94,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
95,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.163,0.163,0.166,0.166,0.165,0.165
96,- Median Distance To Subway,0.160,0.160,0.160,0.160,0.170,0.170
97, , , , , , ,
98,McDonald Ave IBX, , , , , ,
99,- Population,”35,375″, ,”33,530″, ,”32,423″,
100,- Walker Population,”35,375″,”35,375″,”33,530″,”33,530″,”32,423″,”32,423″
101,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
102,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
103,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
104,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.221,0.221,0.220,0.220,0.223,0.223
105,- Median Distance To Subway,0.202,0.200,0.203,0.203,0.204,0.204
106, , , , , , ,
107,Metropolitan Ave IBX, , , , , ,
108,- Population,”11,402″, ,”10,361″, ,”9,860″,
109,- Walker Population,”10,441″,”11,402″,”9,545″,”10,361″,”9,048″,”9,860″
110,- Pct Walker Population,91.6,100.0,92.1,100.0,91.8,100.0
111,- Walker Population Increase, ,961, ,816, ,812
112,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,9.2, ,8.5, ,9.0
113,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.333,0.319,0.333,0.318,0.328,0.313
114,- Median Distance To Subway,0.359,0.330,0.350,0.328,0.348,0.313
115, , , , , , ,
116,Myrtle Ave IBX, , , , , ,
117,- Population,”33,378″, ,”32,322″, ,”32,035″,
118,- Walker Population,”26,465″,”33,378″,”25,901″,”32,322″,”25,776″,”32,035″
119,- Pct Walker Population,79.3,100.0,80.1,100.0,80.5,100.0
120,- Walker Population Increase, ,”6,913″, ,”6,421″, ,”6,259″
121,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,26.1, ,24.8, ,24.3
122,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.330,0.227,0.325,0.227,0.323,0.225
123,- Median Distance To Subway,0.323,0.212,0.318,0.212,0.316,0.212
124, , , , , , ,
125,New Utrecht Ave – 62nd St IBX, , , , , ,
126,- Population,”42,885″, ,”38,713″, ,”35,987″,
127,- Walker Population,”42,885″,”42,885″,”38,713″,”38,713″,”35,987″,”35,987″
128,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
129,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
130,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
131,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.188,0.187,0.189,0.188,0.188,0.187
132,- Median Distance To Subway,0.177,0.177,0.177,0.177,0.179,0.179
133, , , , , , ,
134,Queens Blvd IBX, , , , , ,
135,- Population,”23,103″, ,”22,026″, ,”20,777″,
136,- Walker Population,”18,206″,”23,103″,”18,045″,”22,026″,”17,402″,”20,777″
137,- Pct Walker Population,78.8,100.0,81.9,100.0,83.8,100.0
138,- Walker Population Increase, ,”4,897″, ,”3,981″, ,”3,375″
139,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,26.9, ,22.1, ,19.4
140,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.318,0.215,0.298,0.209,0.288,0.205
141,- Median Distance To Subway,0.277,0.197,0.235,0.191,0.226,0.191
142, , , , , , ,
143,Rockaway Ave – Ave D IBX, , , , , ,
144,- Population,”20,184″, ,”18,296″, ,”18,283″,
145,- Walker Population,”15,718″,”20,184″,”13,373″,”18,296″,”13,097″,”18,283″
146,- Pct Walker Population,77.9,100.0,73.1,100.0,71.6,100.0
147,- Walker Population Increase, ,”4,466″, ,”4,923″, ,”5,186″
148,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,28.4, ,36.8, ,39.6
149,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.382,0.295,0.385,0.296,0.391,0.297
150,- Median Distance To Subway,0.380,0.297,0.380,0.299,0.380,0.295
151, , , , , , ,
152,Utica Ave – Farragut Rd IBX, , , , , ,
153,- Population,”19,848″, ,”18,531″, ,”20,278″,
154,- Walker Population,0,”19,848″,0,”18,531″,0,”20,278″
155,- Pct Walker Population,0.0,100.0,0.0,100.0,0.0,100.0
156,- Walker Population Increase, ,”19,848″, ,”18,531″, ,”20,278″
157,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,inf, ,inf, ,inf
158,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.983,0.356,0.985,0.362,0.979,0.362
159,- Median Distance To Subway,0.986,0.370,0.986,0.375,0.983,0.375
160, , , , , , ,
161,Wilson Ave IBX, , , , , ,
162,- Population,”25,928″, ,”24,825″, ,”22,577″,
163,- Walker Population,”25,928″,”25,928″,”24,825″,”24,825″,”22,577″,”22,577″
164,- Pct Walker Population,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0,100.0
165,- Walker Population Increase, ,0, ,0, ,0
166,- Pct Walker Population Increase, ,0.0, ,0.0, ,0.0
167,- Mean Distance To Subway,0.205,0.205,0.209,0.209,0.210,0.210
168,- Median Distance To Subway,0.197,0.197,0.197,0.197,0.200,0.200
0, , , , , , ,
1,Descending Order by Walker Increase, , , , , ,
2,Utica Ave – Farragut Rd IBX, ,”19,848″, ,”18,531″, ,”20,278″
3,Brooklyn Terminal Market IBX, ,”18,123″, ,”16,907″, ,”17,971″
4,Grand Ave – 79th St IBX, ,”14,518″, ,”12,888″, ,”12,167″
5,Myrtle Ave IBX, ,”6,913″, ,”6,421″, ,”6,259″
6,Queens Blvd IBX, ,”4,897″, ,”3,981″, ,”3,375″
7,Rockaway Ave – Ave D IBX, ,”4,466″, ,”4,923″, ,”5,186″
8,Brooklyn Army Terminal IBX, ,”1,869″, ,”1,612″, ,”1,794″
9,Metropolitan Ave IBX, ,961, ,816, ,812
10,Brooklyn College IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
11,East New York IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
12,Jackson Heights IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
13,Livonia Ave IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
14,McDonald Ave IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
15,New Utrecht Ave – 62nd St IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
16,Wilson Ave IBX, ,0, ,0, ,0
I don’t think the Central Subway is objectively bad, the issue is high cost of building kept it too short, not being short by design. Everyone agrees that the line should continue to stations in North Beach, Fisherman’s Wharf, Marina District and end in the Presidio. Muni is deliberately studying this extension now. These are dense, walkable neighborhoods with high transit use, and the line connects directly with Caltrain. The shortened line already serves high demand stops like the Mission Bay hospital/university complex, downtown arena, convention center, and Union Square shopping district. The convention center, Union Square (cable cars), Chinatown and Fisherman’s Wharf would make up four of the top seven or so tourist/visitor destinations in the city, which should be a recipe for success (probably the top two destinations – Golden Gate Bridge and Alcatraz – would be accessed from Fisherman’s Wharf and the Presidio). If the money spent had built the to the Presidio (at a reasonable but-not-cheap $350M/km) I don’t think you could say the line was useless. Aggravatingly, the tunnel was in fact dug to North Beach to pull out the TBMs, but no tracks or station put in due to cost.
The issue of wrong project isn’t the objective merits of the T/Central Subway alignment, but that any tunneling project in SF that isn’t underneath the length of Geary isn’t priority #1, and after Geary, any tunneling that doesn’t take the M from West Portal past SF State to Park Merced or isn’t underneath Van Van Ness and Mission to at least 30th if not Geneva (with true urban stop spacing, not the existing 1-2 mi BART station spacing) isn’t priority #2 or #3 either.
The bigger issue is will SF even need mass transit at these scales if the city’s employment base continues to drop? The Marina district used to have so many commuters it supported an express bus line to/from downtown during commute times for a trip of less than 5km. Now with so many businesses leaving SF/California, tech workers either revolting to continue work-from-home (Apple, Google) being laid off (Twitter) or both (Salesforce, Facebook/Meta), and San Francisco having one of the highest downtown vacancy rates in the nation, the case for any subway/transit expansion in SF isn’t high.
You’re objectively wrong.
It will never provide better or more popular or more useful service than the bus line that runs above it.
It was always a project of pure graft and corruption, never had anything to do with transportation, and never will.
So how well has that worked for the last four decades of every single rail project, including “continuations”, in the Bay Area going wildly over budget and massively massively massively under ridership “projections”?
Everyone who “thinks” is a fucking idiot and deserves to be put out of our misery.
“It will never provide better . . . or more useful service than the bus line that runs above it”
Google trip planner shows that to take the 30 from Sacramento St to Moscone Center is a longer trip than to take the Central Subway, even though Sac St. is a stop for the 30 (I think) but to take the train you have to start out walking north to Chinatown Station when you want to go south. That’s about as short a practical trip before getting into “its-faster-to-walk-even-in-Paris” territory and even with the bus bias the train still wins; trips to Caltrain or Mission Bay will be even better than the bus. And note that I spoke of the Central Subway route, not the project as built. Its obvious that subway lines are less useful the shorter they are, if the CS continued to North Beach or Fisherman’s Wharf or beyond the advantage of the bus would only grow.
“. . . or more popular . . .”
I guess we will have to wait and see how ridership of the two goes.
As to every project going over budget, that is an issue of the failed public infrastructure program in the Bay Area, not a fault of the route. The bigger issue, as I noted, is that a subway which would have been packed with tech commuters from the Marina or convention goers from Moscone had it opened in 2019 might be empty now, even if better than the bus, since those rider constituencies appear to have evaporated.
I imagine the trip planner doesn’t take into account the time and inconvenience needed to get from station platform to surface.
Yes the Stockton-Columbus-Lombard route to Presidio is a natural rail route, one of two the city is missing (along with Geary) – when both are finished, nearly the whole city will be in walking distance of rail. But the route should have been on the surface (except for the existing Stockton Tunnel and a similar short tunnel under the hilly part of Lombard). This is such a short line (~5km total) that the time gains of widely spaced stops in a tunnel are outweighed by the losses of getting to those stops both horizontally and vertically.
“I imagine the trip planner doesn’t take into account the time and inconvenience needed to get from station platform to surface.”
Yes, this is why the New York Subway, Paris Metro, and London Underground are so poorly used compared to their respective city bus networks. [/SARCASM]
“one of two the city is missing (along with Geary) – when both are finished, nearly the whole city will be in walking distance of rail”
This is technically true of most of the city being walking distance of some rail, but not true of everywhere having a needed subway. As I’ve noted in other comments, the existing route of the M to Park Presidio should be subway even though it is already rail. The Van Ness/Mission corridor should have a subway. The N should be a subway, and as a new part of the CBD the SOMA district should get a subway as well. Also, looking more closely, the city isn’t THAT well covered. Most of the southeast (Excelsior, Visitacion Valley, Hunter’s Point) isn’t rail served by a walking distance standard, since BART stations are spaced so far apart and the T is cut off from much of those areas by the freeway. Same for much of the Sunset between the N and the L or along 19th.
“This is such a short line (~5km total) that the time gains of widely spaced stops in a tunnel are outweighed”
The line is not that short. The total length of the route that should minimum be subway (UCSF hospital to the Presidio) is 9km, and even taking into account the existing tunnel actually starts under the freeway you would have an ~7km tunnel. This is plenty long for a subway, especially considering that it is almost all on one side of the CBD. Station spacing is an issue, but so far the Central Subway has proper (~0.5mi/800m between stations, like Market St) urban spacing so if continued for the remainder of the line it should provide convenient access with better trip times than surface transit (just like other cities with good subway service).
The line shouldn’t turn west at Lombard, it should continue down Columbus to Bay St to reach Fisherman’s Wharf. It can then turn back south a bit to get to Lombard past Van Ness.
Where SF could use surface rail is in the outer areas that don’t have as high travel density or as orthogonal connectors to the subways leading downtown. A line Geneva-Ocean-19th (extending the current tracks for the K on Ocean) would be a good idea; turning the J to go west on Caesar Chavez to meet the T-3rd, then extending it north along Webster to meet a future Geary Subway in Japantown would be another).
New York and Paris have famously shallow stations, as does Berlin. London stations are deeper but the street network in London is a meme. And all four cities have long lines, where even short connections, like the 42nd Street Shuttle, are used in-system; the problem with the Central Subway is a combination of meh market, short line, and hilariously deep stations.
the N is the second priority after geary. the M already runs for most of its length in a dedicated right of way, any sane transit agency would have been running the M with signal priority since its opening. instead muni is planning to spend billions to avoid provoking the car lobby
In round numbers 1) the route of the M past W. Portal*, 2) the N past the Sunset Tunnel, and 3) all other tracks west of the Twin Peaks tunnel each get the same number of riders. But the M route does this in about 3km, the N needs 5.5km and all other routes (K,T,L,outer M) need over 10km. The highest passenger density is clearly along the M. 3km of subway should not be a difficult or expensive project, and to put the N underground requires a futher 0.75km east of the Sunset tunnel. Most passengers for fewest route miles is the best bet.
The north-south Van Ness and Mission corridor also has a higher riders/km than the N. In fact it is even higher than the M route, but considering that a practical core line north of the Bernal Cut would be 7.5km vs 3km to Park Merced, and that the M at the outer edges of the city almost beats the heart-of-the-city route, I would give the M the #2 spot if pressed, but in general they should be considered a joint #2/3 priority. Building both at once would be about the same length as building all of Geary.
Extending the Central Subway also has higher potential ridership/km than the N, although not as decisively as the other projects above (perhaps 1.2x instead of 1.5-2x).
Making the N a subway should wait for later when the network is more fully built out (see priorities above). Then, instead of joining the Market Subway, it could be extended east along 16th to serve the Castro and Inner Mission, before turning up Potrero/Brannan to serve SOMA & S. Beach before ending under Beale at Transbay/Embarcadero station. A long line and a major project but one that would provide major coverage both in terms of areas served and connections/formation of a grid (connections at Market, Mission, 4th, 2nd, etc.)
*Note that for an accurate assessment you need to look at ridership along the *route* of the M, not just on trains signed M. K trains stopping along W Portal ave contribute to these ridership numbers, as do L trains at stops on 15th a block away, etc. If there were a subway entrance at Sloat & W Portal everyone using those other lines/stops now would just walk to the subway instead.
I don’t think you really responded to the point that there’s no practical reason to bury the M. I suppose the 1 km or so from the tunnel to Sloat would be better underground, but I can’t imagine the cost would be worth it as we can’t be talking about that much time savings. Otherwise, it runs in its own right-of-way with only a few at-grade crossings between Sloat and Park Merced. Those crossing could surely be improved — to the degree they need to be — much more cheaply than by building a new subway. Tunneling seems like a big waste of money.
Much of Alon Levy’s analysis of what Los Angeles (LA) does wrong is on point:
1. Prioritizing low ridership segments for political support over core connectivity.
2. Using the wrong modes for rights of way.
3. No transit oriented development plan when planning transit projects.
4. Funding not just transit, but also roads and freeways.
5. Haphazard collection of projects by geography.
6. Lack of systemic, paradigmatic changes like electrifying commuter rail, or bus lanes on every major arterial corridor.
Here are some additional insights:
1. LA has moderate density across a wide area. Ridership levels justify a few grade-separated rail lines in the high density core and through high traffic geographic chokepoints (such as mountain passes) near the core.
2. Otherwise, a regionwide bus lane network on every major arterial, together with double-tracked, electrified commuter rail, would be more effective investments, generating far more ridership than a small number of rail lines, at a small fraction of the cost.
3. Double-tracking and electrifying the Metrolink commuter rail system would have tremendous benefits, allowing much more frequent service that would boost ridership. Currently, Metrolink operates mostly on a less-than-hourly basis. Double-tracking would allow frequencies of 2-3x/hour, becoming closer to rapid transit.
4. LA Metro explicitly refuses to study transit oriented development (TOD) when studying transit project alignments, even when stakeholders ask for it. Instead, LA Metro only begins considering TOD after transit project construction is well underway, when LA Metro needs to think about disposing of the property it’s using for construction staging.
5. LA stations are wildly too expensive. The underground stations have large mezzanines, but even more than that, the at-grade high level platforms seem to cost an order of magnitude more than other cities.
6. Free and reduced priced transit in LA makes sense for several reasons:
a. While LA rents are close to NY, SF, and DC, its area median income (AMI) is much lower, and in particular, has a much higher percentage of extremely low income (<30% of AMI) households.
b. Over 70% of LA Metro riders have extremely low income.
c. Fare collection costs are a high fraction of LA fare revenue.
d. Low income residents are more inclined to consider transit because the cost of driving is high relative to their income.
e. Low income drivers disproportionately drive older, more polluting vehicles.
f. Because of mountains, LA suffers greater air pollution than any other US metropolitan area, so reductions in driving matter more.
g. A small reduction in the number of drivers can have disproportionate impact on traffic, so the pollution reduction can be more than one-to-one.
7. The Foothill Extension that Alon cites as an example of a wrong project is more a project done wrong. It connects eight colleges in otherwise low density suburbs along a relatively straight disused rail right of way, so it was not unreasonable per se as a lower priority project that could have been done cheaply. LA implemented it wrong not only by building it ahead of lines with higher ridership potential, but also by expensive grade separations of intersections and especially, expensive parking structures to appease local electeds in those low density suburbs whose voters for the most part wouldn't be the riders the line would serve anyway.
8. As Alon pointed out, a significant part of the West Santa Ana Branch length runs through low ridership suburbs, even though it also serves dense inner city areas too. South of the Metro C Green Line, the West Santa Ana Branch runs in a straight line to Orange County, so it would have been an ideal alignment for high-speed rail or at least commuter rail, which would have been reasonable for the population density there. But why use an ideal corridor when you can try to shoehorn high-speed rail on a less suitable corridor at much higher cost? The LA way!
9. Even when LA starts with the right general idea for a big project, LA implements it in suboptimal ways:
a. LA refused to build a station in the Financial District, where the tallest high rise buildings are, on the Regional Connector downtown, even though the chamber of commerce and a city councilmember pushed for it, in favor of a station next to development lots owned by a billionaire funder of the then-mayor's political campaigns.
b. The Sepulveda Transit Corridor (STC), connecting the job-rich, dense Westside to the San Fernando Valley, could have looked to Alon Levy's insight on the benefit of radial connectivity (such as his example of Burbank to Pasadena) by interlining the STC project with the existing Metro B Red Line subway.
There would be high ridership going both directions all day between the lines because both the Westside and Hollywood/Downtown are strong destinations. Most of the Orange Line ridership is in that segment already. Plus, the Metro G Orange Line busway is funded to be converted to rail in the final years of the Measure M expenditure plan.
Interlining would address another challenge for the STC project: the potential to overload the East San Fernando Valley (ESFV) Line near and at their connection point. By spreading ridership across stations at Sepulveda Blvd., Van Nuys Blvd., Valley College, and North Hollywood, interlining would relieve pressure on the ESFV Line, and without forcing riders in Van Nuys to either backtrack north to travel south on the Sepulveda Line, or to transfer twice from the ESFV Line to the G Orange Line and then to the Sepulveda Line. Currently, Metro anticipates that every alternative except Alternative 6 would require this. Savings from not having to extend the Sepulveda Line to Van Nuys Metrolink Station could be used to interline instead.
Also, Metro could use the large Sepulveda Station parking lot for a rail yard, giving more flexibility to both lines.
Finally, by not going to Van Nuys Metrolink, LA would avoid infringing on the Metrolink right of way, which would greatly benefit from being double tracked in the future.
Instead, LA decided to turn the STC project into a "public private partnership" in which LA is funding not one, not two, but three (!) contractors over $100 million just to study (!!) competing concepts!!! And of course, none of these include interlining as a possibility…
> “LA refused to build a station in the Financial District, where the tallest high rise buildings are, on the Regional Connector downtown, even though the chamber of commerce and a city councilmember pushed for it, in favor of a station next to development lots owned by a billionaire funder of the then-mayor’s political campaigns.”
People sleep on how bad parts of the execution of the Regional Connector are. The new station locations are baffling. (Or, as you allude to, maybe we should say “baffling”.) It will serve its “connector” function fine, but will provide relatively little value in and of itself despite going right through downtown.
The danger if you completely ignore local people is that you have to make other mitigations and have a cost explosion over that.
So you are advocating for spending billions of dollars to duplicate the existing Orange Line (scheduled for upgrade to rail) between North Hollywood and Van Nuys Blvd, perhaps forever forestalling the possibility of extending the subway north from North Hollywood?
The Financial District is easily reachable from the 7th St station via walking a couple blocks. The 2nd/Hope station covers a huge redevelopment area and a part of NW downtown that would otherwise be very far from any rail station.
If you only looked at a map, the West Santa Ana branch looks like it goes through low density suburban areas. In reality, it will be one of the highest ridership lines in Los Angeles due to the low incomes and hidden density (many people squished into one single family home) along the corridor. Due to the very high fares of Metrolink, it is not an option for low income people.
In terms of funding for roads, it is easy to be a transit critic when you don’t need the public to vote on whether you can get money to build your transit projects.
It is easy to hate on Los Angeles Metro, and some of their operations management lately perhaps could be improved in regards to some safety issues riders have experienced recently, but they are really doing a great job and the region is really the only non-legacy rail metropolitan area in the United States that is making an effort to be a transit city (eh maybe Seattle and Portland as well).
That favourite line of Alon’s caused an itch but this time I didn’t bother scratching it. However I just stumbled across the following:
One hundred percent of buses, and most trams, are accessible, and without special requirements at each stop. The main downside is that the journey might take longer though given the sheer density of routes and stops one can get much closer to one’s final destination than the Metro or RER. Arguably this provides much greater accessibility than expensive modification of the Metro ever would, especially in the suburbs, and after-hours due to the 40 Noctilien bus lines operating when the Metro+RER isn’t.
So several conclusions come from this. First, is that Paris does seem to believe in accessibility. It’s not even fair to say that Paris Metro doesn’t care since it is run by RATP and they provide 13,000 points of accessibility across the city. Second, what do the people who need accessibility think, versus all those sanctimonious types and activists who like to complain on their behalf? As many have noted, next year’s Olympics might be a revealing moment if slightly complicated by the completely accessible M14 which will serve the main Olympic site. However, journalists and the media don’t seem capable of a balanced take on this issue and rather seem to demand that absolutely everywhere must be made accessible, even though the only reason to access the Metro is to get from A to B, which obviously can be achieved by multiple means.
Final point would be putting it in the perspective of this article, ie. would putting the estimated €11 billion into making the Metro accessible be a correct prioritisation of transport needs? If Alon was forced to choose between say, his fave of doubling the RER tunnel between Gare du Nord and Chatelet (probably only a few billion euros) etc? In fact it is a significant fraction of the cost of GPX.
It’s not special that all buses are accessible – the US has long had that. The problem is that the buses are still buses and not the subway or the Métro or the U-Bahn or the Underground.
The people who need accessibility in Paris are livid that the Métro is inaccessible and are trying to sue and use other political organizing tactics to get the region to spend what RATP says would be a 5 billion € program in mid-to-late-2010s prices (which would be a rather high cost per station for a non-Anglo place). I have never seen 11 billion, which would encroach on New York prices and would have to come from a place of sandbagging.
Edit: and while we’re at it, there’s plenty of places to find 5 billion for Métro accessibility – for example, canceling M18, which is unpopular among area advocates. Macron is also creating fiscal space for France to spend its resources on things other than early retirement (a program that was instituted by Mitterand in 1983 and that is not visible in French inequality statistics), and one of them could be accessibility on the Métro.
I never said otherwise. However, I doubt there are many places, especially in the US, that has anything approaching the sheer scope/density of the bus system in Greater Paris, never mind inner-Paris.
Any references for that … and which aren’t just the usual self-appointed activists? I’ve observed this lot scream loudly for the past several decades, sometimes for perfectly reasonable access issues but I don’t believe this is one of them. It’s an unreasonable entitlement when the issue, wrt to transit, is not whether any particular, or in their minds every feasible form of transport must be accessible, never mind the cost or the disruption in trying to provide it. The only issue that should matter is whether Paris and the majority of its public amenities is accessible. And it is. Much more accessible by bus than it ever could be by Metro.
If one did an audit comparing cities for real accessibility (not mode of accessibility), Paris would rate very highly. Only if you took the completely arbitrary measure of exclusive Metro accessibility would it fail. But don’t be fooled by London or Barcelona or any number of older systems that have made attempts to bring (partial) accessibility to their old systems: their underground systems in their cores often remain inaccessible which in many ways makes them worse. I’ve read that the NY subway can be like this in that sometimes wheelchair users can get trapped because of incomplete station compliance and apparently a high rate of failure of elevators (and perhaps peculiar to NYC MTA’s dysfunction, the average 30d to repair them; no idea if that is true but it sounds plausible if ridiculous). In that regard I wonder about Paris-M14, in that wheelchair users would have to exit almost all stations rather than expect to transfer. I also assume that M15 will be fully accessible which will greatly aid travel around Greater Paris, even if they won’t be able to transfer from it to the old radial Metro system.
Put another way, if advice was given to potential wheelchair-bound visitors that they would not be able to get around Paris by public transit, then that would be outrageously misleading and doing them a disservice. Yet it is often what we read.
Accessibility to the Metro, implied as the sole means of transport within the city, is not like, say, making the Eiffel Tower accessible, or all the museums, or the Grands Magazines, or schools, universities, mairies etc etc. If on the other hand you want to make all points accessible from all other points in the Metro area, then Paris actually does that perfectly adequately.
You didn’t answer the question of how you would prioritise it. What would you sacrifice to achieve Metro accessibility?
Ha, do we actually agree on Macron? Who you have previously slurred as a neo-liberal rightard?
Yeah, I was there when Mitterrand reduced the retirement age to 60, and privatised the banks, both of which might seem not unreasonable, until one looks a bit deeper and longer-term.
But I think that spending some of any notionally ‘saved’ state expenditure on €5 to €10bn on Metro accessibility inappropriate. But it doesn’t work like that; these changes are to make the pension system self-funded and sustainable. It would make more sense to subsidise a taxi service for the disabled which would cost a relatively trivial amount each year. (Funny enough this would work better in the UK where the classic London cab can take wheelchairs, ie. with their occupants in the wheelchair. However a subsidy system for the disabled–which might even exist–would be a big drain because anyone can get registered as disabled there! And they do, so they can access privileged parking etc.)
You mean NIMBYs? Is it the particular route? ie. would it ‘save’ money or simply spend it on a similar alternative? Of course it is to serve the tech-university corridor (Saclay mega-campus) so as a bit of long-term urban planning I have to agree with it. Surely it makes more sense than M17 (except that I reckon the long-term intention must be to close the airport spur of RER-B to free up the eastward RER-B)?
Then, even though I asked for a prioritisation, we both know that money for such projects is not really fungible. Not readily transferred to some other project and more likely just not spent at all.
Sorry, but no. There are growing international standards for what it means for a city to be accessible, and they include the entire metro network and not just buses, which a lot of riders with chronic pain issues avoid out of reasons of fatigue anyway. London is not what Paris should compare itself with; Berlin (80% accessible) is, and Madrid (around 70%), and Hamburg (90%), and Tokyo (I believe 100%), and Stockholm (also 100%), and Barcelona (93% accessible). Seoul’s 93% had an “only” in front of it and there were mass protests last year.
And the M18 opponents are normie transit advocates – same kind who oppose the Central Subway in San Francisco. Paris overall has decent project prioritization so the advocates only oppose small parts of the program (M17, M18), but some investment plans are just bad on benefit-cost ratios. (And before you complain about econocrats and neoliberals: M17 is a third airport connector for people who look down on the RER B and M18 passes entirely through rich suburbs, neither benefiting the sort of social classes who think Mélenchon is sane).
Then I simply repeat that that is a very restrictive and nearly meaningless definition of making a city accessible. Do you really advise the disabled or the aged or the mothers with prams that Paris is impossible?
Of course this is really a guideline for newly-built Metro or any infrastructure.
Further, I’d bet the 20% of Berlin and 30% of Madrid that is not accessible is the part in the inner core and is probably broadly equivalent to the area covered by the Paris Metro. Tokyo is mostly elevated so easy to do. Stockholm was built in the modern era, and 50% is above ground. I mean it’s like comparing M14 versus M1-M13. So, in the real world, yes London is the most comparable–though even there, much more is above ground but then, yet again, that is why it is partial and the least accessible is in the old core where it is underground with very constrained space both underground and above ground; look at what they had to do to get those Crossrail stations!.
I find the objections, if I understand, to M18 to be very weak. I think I’ve said it before, that the justification is to support the tech and university research corridor plus an area for further housing development. The fact that it is entirely a rich area should be neither here nor there, since it is only at the extreme upper end will you find a bias against using the Metro (especially with it connecting to an airport and La Defense). (Did Sarkozy cave to those rich NIMBYs, to be then reversed by Hollande?) As you know I distrust most BCAs especially as they never account for housing issues or other so-called intangibles that some easy algorithm finds too difficult or conjectural. BCAs are most often manipulated (by the big 4 consultancies) to get a result someone is paying for and usually bad. Instead I believe in long-term planning driven by an urban vision. I also believe in building stuff when you can, as it always becomes more difficult with time and of course more expensive, sometimes horrendously more expensive. I’m glad to see the NIMBYs were overridden by the urbanists in government.
As to M17, it does seem mysterious. I don’t really buy the notion of “people who look down on the RER B”, except that for western suburbanites it will save them going into the centre and back out again. Corresponding in either Gare du Nord or Chatelet, yech. I suppose relieving those congestion points, and shifting it to St Denis-Pleyel is part justification …
Is there anyone who thinks Mélenchon is sane? He’s not entirely stupid in that his refusal to even consult with Macron over the pension issue “works” in the short-term at least to make Macron look “unreasonable” which is a travesty of the truth. Ditto the unions. You know why? Because it is well known that one-on-one, or in a sit-down discussion, Macron has the ability to convince opponents who initially aggressively oppose an idea; and the reason for that is that he has used logic and evidence to arrive at the position himself (unlike most politicians driven by ideology or compromised partisan politics). He does his homework and he argues in a calm and honest way. It doesn’t mean he can’t be wrong but not often … Incidentally I am glad to see that he is going to be correct about his proclamation just after the fire, that Notre Dame would be rebuilt by the Olympics (against all the naysayers and nitpickers who claimed it would take a decade … Anglosphere disease avoided, unlike say the 2 decades it took to rebuild the WTC etc).
Rebuilding an old church that would have needed old techniques and you had an existing likely undocumented structure quicker than the WTC is actually genuinely impressive.
Japan also has the fact that most of its cities were firebombed to the ground by the Americans in world war 2 so most of the construction is new.
I’m sure that meant the metro stations could be less constrained than London/Paris which have much older buildings in the centre that pre-date rapid transport and cars.
Tokyo’s construction was mostly in the 1960s and 70s. This means that on the one hand, it predates modern accessibility codes, and on the other hand, it was built in an already built-out city center with very strong property rights laws making it hard to take private property for infrastructure. A Japanese rail engineer working in the US told me the reason the Tokyo subway has so many missed connections, more than any city except New York, is that it was too hard to acquire underground easements to build the required transfer corridors.
Note also that in Western Europe, the cities other than London and Paris with very old subways are much more accessible: Berlin, Hamburg, Madrid, Barcelona.
Around 2/3rds of Madrid and Barcelona is pretty new to be fair though, so Madrid only having 70% accessible is pretty poor. Barcelona having 93% is better – but basically they’ve retrofitted around 1/4 of their current current network which is similar to London.
Paris is full of new extensions, none of which other than M14 is accessible; it’s still building inaccessible stations, because it doesn’t care.
Berlin and Hamburg have both clearly taken it more seriously to be fair.
Michael, responding to your comment:
1. My partner has chronic pain and found the Métro’s lack of elevators and the lack of curb cuts for pedestrians frustrating. I was likewise frustrated whenever I had luggage; the RER does have elevators but whenever the elevator access to the RER at Nation didn’t work and I had to go through the Métro it was a lot of pain and I missed a flight over that.
2. Berlin’s missing 20% is not mostly inner-core at all – it’s mostly lower-ridership stations or stations in poorer areas, like a bunch of non-transfer stations on U8. The transfer points are accessible; even in New York, the most important stations have elevators. In Madrid, ongoing investment is by ridership and only four transfer station remain inaccessible and all are in the 2021-8 elevator installation program.
3. The cost of elevator installation is the same at elevated and underground stations (and also the U-Bahn is 80% underground).
4. Parisians absolutely look down on the RER B and on Gare du Nord, complete with urban renewal proposals for the area that are designed as in 1950s’ America as a way of removing black people from where business travelers might see them. This is why, in a city with perfectly serviceable frequent trains to the airport, there’s a CDG Express plan, in addition to M17.
5. The objection to M18 is that the projected cost per rider is too high and there is no social reason to eat that since the line would exclusively serve the rich. It’s not the same as a BCA – in fact, one of the main critiques of the BCA is that it is bad at capturing benefits like modal shift and at the end of the day it provides no added value over directly projecting ridership.
6. A lot of people think Mélenchon is sane, yes, even with the anti-Semitism, the Putinism, and the soft corona denial. 20% of the electorate keeps voting for him in a wide field, and in current polling he might make it to the second round versus Le Pen if LREM picks Darmanin or Le Maire as its candidate (and I don’t even think Mélenchon is worse than Darmanin, a psychopathic Anglo-style interior minister who thinks France’s biggest problem is ethnic food at the supermarket).
7. Disaster recovery isn’t strongly correlated with costs in general; the US at times pulls together and fixes things quickly, to the point that Jim Aloisi told Governor Deval Patrick that the fastest way to fix a certain bridge over the Charles would be to destroy it in a terrorist attack or natural disaster so that it would be rebuilt quickly. The infrastructure cost explosion is more about how the state isn’t making any effort to grow in ordinary times, and France is undergoing that incrementally, just starting from a way better position than the UK.