Category: Regional Rail

New York-New Haven Trains in an Hour

Devin Wilkins and I are still working on coming up with a coordinated timetable on the Northeast Corridor, north to south. Devin just shared with me the code she was running on both routes from New Haven to New York – to Grand Central and to Penn Station – and, taking into account the quality of the right-of-way and tunnels but not timetable padding and conservative curve speeds – it looks like intercity trains would do it in about an hour. The current code produces around 57 minutes with 7% timetable pad if I’m getting the Penn Station throat and tunnel slowdowns right – but that’s an if; but at this point, I’m confident about the figure of “about an hour” on the current right-of-way.

I bring this up to give updates on how the more accurate coding is changing the timetable compared to previous estimates, but also to talk about what this means for future investment priorities.

First, the curve radii I was assuming in posts I was writing last decade were consistently too optimistic. I wrote three months ago about how even within the highest speed zone in southern Rhode Island, there’s a curve with radius 1,746 meters (1 degree in American parlance), which corresponds to about 215 km/h with aggressive cant and cant deficiency. At this point we’ve found numbers coming straight from Amtrak, Metro-North, and MBTA, letting us cobble together speed zones for the entire system.

But second, conversely, I was being too conservative with how I was setting speed zones. My principle was that the tightest curve on a section sets the entire speed limit; when writing commuter rail timetables, I would usually have each interstation segment be a uniform speed zone, varying from this practice only when the interstation was atypically long and had long straight sections with a tight curve between them. When writing intercity timetables, I’d simplify by having the typical curves on a line set the speed limit and then have a handful of lower speed limits for tighter curves; for example, most curves on the New Haven Line are 873 meters, permitting 153 km/h with aggressive high-speed rail cant and cant deficiency, and 157 km/h with aggressive limits for slower trains, which can run at slightly higher cant deficiency, but those sections are punctuated by some sharper curves with lower limits. Devin, using better code than me, instead lets a train accelerate to higher speed on straight sections and then decelerate as soon as it needs to. Usually such aggressive driving is not preferred, and is used only when recovering from delays – but the timetable is already padded somewhat, so it might as well be padded relative to the fastest technical speed.

The upshot of all of this is that the speed gains from just being able to run at the maximum speed permitted by the right-of-way are massive. The trip time today is 1:37 on the fastest trains between New York and New Haven. Commuter trains take 2:10, making all stops from New Haven to Stamford and then running nonstop between Stamford and Manhattan; in our model, with a top speed of 150 km/h, high-performance regional trains like the FLIRT, Talent 3, or Mireo should do the trip in about 1:15-1:20, and while we didn’t model the current rolling stock, my suspicion is that it should be around six minutes longer. The small difference in trip time is partly because Penn Station’s approach is a few kilometers longer than Grand Central’s and the curves in Queens and on the Hell Gate Bridge are tight.

What this means is that the highest priority should be getting trains down to this speed. In the Swiss electronics-before-concrete schema, the benefits of electronics on the Northeast Corridor are massive; concrete has considerable benefits as well, especially on sections where the current right-of-way constrains not just speed but also reliability and capacity, like New Haven-Kingston, but the benefits of electronics are so large that it’s imperative to make targeted investments to allow for such clean schedules.

Those investments do include concrete, to be clear. But it’s concrete that aims to make the trains flow more smoothly, in support of a repetitive schedule with few variations in train stopping patterns, so that the trains can be timetabled in advance not to conflict. At this point, I believe that grade-separating the interlocking at New Rochelle, popularly called Shell Interlocking and technically called CP 216, is essential and must be prioritized over anything else between the city limits of New York and New Haven Union Station. Currently, there’s very high peak traffic through the interlocking, with a flat junction between trains to Penn Station and trains to Grand Central.

On the electronics side, the timetables must become more regular. There are currently 20 peak trains per hour on the New Haven Line into Grand Central; of those, four go to branches and 16 are on the main line, and among the 16, there are 13 different stopping patterns, on top of the intercity trains. It is not possible to timetable so many different trains on a complex system and be sure that everything is conflict-free, and as a result, delays abound, to which the response is to pad the schedules. But since the padded schedules still have conflicts, there is a ratchet of slowdowns and padding, to the point that a delayed train can recover 20 minutes on less than the entire line. Instead, every train should either be a local train to Stamford or an express train beyond Stamford, and there should only be a single express pattern on the inner line, which today is nonstop between Harlem and Stamford and in the future should include a stop at New Rochelle; this means that, not taking intercity trains into account, the main line should have at most four stopping patterns (local vs. express, and Penn Station vs. Grand Central), and probably just three, since express commuter trains should be going to Grand Central and not Penn Station, as passengers from Stamford to Penn Station can just ride intercity trains.

Also on the electronics side, the way the line is maintained currently is inefficient to an extent measured in orders of magnitude and not factors or percents. Track inspection is manual; Metro-North finally bought a track geometry machine but uses it extremely unproductively, with one report saying it gets one tenth as much work done as intended. Normally these machines can do about a track-mile in an overnight work window, which means the entire four-track line can be regraded and fixed in less than a year of overnights, but they apparently can’t achieve that. Whatever they’re doing isn’t working; the annual spending on track renewal in Connecticut is what Germany spends on once-in-a-generation renewal. The endless renewal work includes a plethora of ever-shifting slow zones, and at no point is the entire system from New York to New Haven clear for trains, even on weekdays. The excessively complex schedule, on tracks that constantly shift due to segment-by-segment daytime repairs, is turning a trip that should be doable on current rolling stock in perhaps 1:23 into one that takes 2:10.

The billions of dollars in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that are dedicated to the Northeast Corridor and have not yet been spent can reduce trip times further. But the baseline should be that the bucket of money is a few hundreds of millions smaller and the base case trip time from New York to New Haven is an hour and not 1:37; this is what the system should be compared with.

Reverse- and Through-Commute Trends

I poked around some comparable data for commuting around New York for 2007 and 2019 the other day, using OnTheMap. The motivation is that I’d made two graphics of through-commutes in the region, one in 2017 (see link here, I can’t find the original article anymore) and one this year for the ETA report (see here, go to section 2B). The nicer second graphic was made by Kara Fischer, not by me, but also has about twice the volume of through-commutes, partly due to a switch in source to the more precise OnTheMap, partly due to growth. It’s the issue of growth I’d like to go over in this post.

In all cases, I’m going to compare data from 2007 and 2019. This is because these years were both business cycle peaks, and this is the best way to compare data from different years. The topline result is that commutes of all kinds are up – the US had economic growth in 2007-19 and New York participated in it – but cross-regional commutes grew much more than commutes to Manhattan. New Jersey especially grew as a residential place, thanks to its faster housing growth, to the point that by 2019, commute volumes from the state to Manhattan matched those of all east-of-Hudson suburbs combined. The analysis counts all jobs, including secondary jobs.

For the purposes of the tables below, Long Island comprises Nassau and Suffolk Counties, and Metro-North territory comprises Westchester, Putnam, and Duchess Counties and all of Connecticut.

2007 data

From\ToManhattanBrooklynQueensBronxStaten IslandLong IslandMetro-NorthNew Jersey
Manhattan449,30830,71622,02817,7461,97417,57420,28129,031
Brooklyn385,943299,05676,49916,1219,28840,84717,17525,887
Queens328,78589,982216,98819,2274,350107,63421,73718,555
Bronx184,59435,99429,81897,3972,33720,20041,31615,467
Staten Island59,57230,2417,2232,32649,6797,5143,65517,919
Long Island163,98845,12177,33712,7245,103926,91232,80612,557
Metro-North124,95212,60614,22824,1311,96229,3441,897,39215,413
New Jersey245,37323,45517,49611,0228,10917,46022,0733,523,860

2019 data

From\ToManhattanBrooklynQueensBronxStaten IslandLong IslandMetro-NorthNew Jersey
Manhattan570,32156,01944,06331,9474,00020,67822,14635,243
Brooklyn486,757429,234119,58826,19217,07343,41018,30133,119
Queens384,186134,063308,90336,3397,640121,19425,21622,863
Bronx224,58362,37758,124135,2884,36426,17245,34717,387
Staten Island59,77840,99413,9715,21856,9539,8773,51019,442
Long Island191,23959,241102,93923,2468,132971,19340,13014,724
Metro-North153,48221,28323,49837,1473,17940,5861,874,61820,819
New Jersey345,55140,39729,52317,46714,13423,43929,7553,614,386

Growth

From\ToManhattanBrooklynQueensBronxStaten IslandLong IslandMetro-NorthNew Jersey
Manhattan26.93%82.38%100.03%80.02%102.63%17.66%9.20%21.40%
Brooklyn26.12%43.53%56.33%62.47%83.82%6.27%6.56%27.94%
Queens16.85%48.99%42.36%89.00%75.63%12.60%16.00%23.22%
Bronx21.66%73.30%94.93%38.90%86.74%29.56%9.76%12.41%
Staten Island0.35%35.56%93.42%124.33%14.64%31.45%-3.97%8.50%
Long Island16.62%31.29%33.10%82.69%59.36%4.78%22.33%17.26%
Metro-North22.83%68.83%65.15%53.94%62.03%38.31%-1.20%35.07%
New Jersey40.83%72.23%68.74%58.47%74.30%34.24%34.80%2.57%

Some patterns

Commutes to Manhattan are up 24.37% over the entire period. This is actually higher than the rise in all commutes in the table combined, because of the weight of intra-suburban commutes (internal to New Jersey, Metro-North territory, or Long Island), which stagnated over this period. However, the rise in all commutes that are not to Manhattan and are also not internal to one of the three suburban zones is much greater, 41.11%.

This 41.11% growth was uneven over this period. Every group of commuters to the suburbs did worse than this. On net, commutes to New Jersey, Metro-North territory, and Long Island, each excluding internal commutes, grew 21.34%, 15.95%, and 18.62%, all underperforming commutes to Manhattan. Some subgroups did somewhat better – commutes from New Jersey and Metro-North to the rest of suburbia grew healthily (they’re the top four among the cells describing commutes to the suburbs) – but overall, this isn’t really about suburban job growth, which lagged in this period.

In contrast, commutes to the Outer Boroughs grew at a collective rate of 50.31%. All four intra-borough numbers (five if we include Manhattan) did worse than this; rather, people commuted between Outer Boroughs at skyrocketing rates in this period, and many suburbanites started commuting to the Outer Boroughs too. Among these, the cis-Manhattan commutes – Long Island to Brooklyn and Queens, and Metro-North territory to the Bronx – grew less rapidly (31.29%, 33.1%, 53.94% respectively), while the trans-Manhattan commutes grew very rapidly, New Jersey-Brooklyn growing 72.23%.

New Jersey had especially high growth rates as an origin. Not counting intra-state commutes, commutes as an origin grew 45% (Long Island: 25.75%; Metro-North territory: 34.75%), due to the relatively high rate of housing construction in the state. By 2019, commutes from New Jersey to Manhattan grew to be about equal in volumes to commutes from the two east-of-Hudson suburban regions combined.

Overall, trans-Hudson through-commutes – those between New Jersey and anywhere in the table except Manhattan and Staten Island – grew from 179,385 to 249,493, 39% in total, with New Jersey growing much faster as an origin than a destination for such commutes (53.63% vs. 23.93%); through-commutes between the Bronx or Metro-North territory and Brooklyn grew 56.48%, reaching 128,153 people, with Brooklyn growing 72.13% as a destination for such commutes and 33.63% as an origin.

What this means for commuter rail

Increasingly, through-running isn’t about unlocking new markets, although I think that better through-service is bound to increase the size of the overall commute volume. Rather, it’s about serving commutes that exist, or at least did on the eve of the pandemic. About half of the through-commutes are to Brooklyn, the Bronx, or Queens; the other half are to the suburbs (largely to New Jersey).

The comparison must be with reverse-commutes. Those are also traditionally ignored by commuter rail, but Metro-North made a serious effort to accommodate the high-end ones from the city to edge cities including White Plains, Greenwich, and Stamford, where consequently transit commuters outearn drivers in workplace geography. The LIRR, which long ran its Main Line one-way at rush hour to maintain express service on the two-track line, sold the third track project as opening new reverse-commutes. But none of these markets is growing much, and the only cis-Manhattan one that’s large is Queens to Long Island, which has an extremely diffuse job geography. In contrast, the larger and faster-growing through-markets are ignored.

Short (cis-Manhattan) trips are growing healthily too. They are eclipsed by some through-commutes, but Long Island to Queens and Brooklyn and Metro-North territory to the Bronx all grew very fast, and at least for the first two, the work destinations are fairly clustered near the LIRR (but the Bronx jobs are not at all clustered near Metro-North).

The fast job growth in all four Outer Boroughs means that it’s better to think of commuter rail as linking the suburbs with the city than just linking the suburbs with Penn Station or Grand Central. There isn’t much suburban job growth, but New Jersey has residential growth (the other two suburban regions don’t), and the city has job growth, with increasing complexity as more job centers emerge outside Manhattan and as people travel between them and not just to Manhattan.

Commuter Suburbs and Express and Local Trains

At both TransitMatters and my ongoing Northeast Corridor high-speed rail timetabling project, one question we face is how to mix local and express trains on the same line. I blogged about this years ago, but that was from first principles and this is from a much better position of using Devin Wilkins’ code and analysis of recent research on rail timetabling to evaluate alternatives.

Most of this post is going to be about the Worcester Line in Boston, which we used as a test case; thus, the following two sections cover how to modernize the line, which will be covered in greater detail in an upcoming TransitMatters report, and you can skip them if you genuinely don’t care about Boston. But much of the analysis generalizes, especially when it relates to the issue of American commuter suburbs and their land use. This land use makes neat express patterns hard to justify in most cases, and the outcome in historic American planning has often been irregular patterns, which in postwar suburban New York led to regularizing around zonal express trains, designed to be usable only by rush hour suburb-to-city commuters and nobody else. Nonetheless, it’s still possible to run coherent timetables that make suburb-to-city commutes convenient while also making other trips viable – it just requires running fewer express trains in most cases.

The Worcester Line’s current situation

The Worcester Line connects Boston and Worcester. It is 71 km long and double-track and has 17 stops on the way. There is a planned infill station within Boston at West Station in Allston, and one to four potential infill locations on the way (Newton Corner is the most interesting; the other three are US 20 and the poorly-named Plantation Street in Worcester and Parsons Street in Faneuil). On the way, it passes largely through commuter suburbs of Boston, with one intermediate city, Framingham, station #12 out of Boston, at km-point 34.4, dividing the line into an inner and outer zone. Atypically for a Boston commuter line, seven stations in the inner zone not only don’t have level boarding, but also don’t even have a railcar length’s worth of high platform for wheelchair accessibility (called “mini-highs” in Boston).

All trains are pulled by diesel locomotives. Currently, off-peak and on weekends, all trains make all stops, running roughly hourly. At rush hour, trains either run local between Framingham and Boston, or express between Worcester and Boston, the latter trains running nonstop between the last station in Boston (Boston Landing, #3) and West Natick (#11) and running local beyond; each of the two patterns ran roughly half-hourly before corona, but currently runs roughly every 45 minutes.

Exceptionally, reverse-peak and some midday trains do not stop at the Newton stations (#4-6), where not only are the platforms low but also they only serve one track, and so the peak trains use the track with Newton platforms and the reverse-peak trains use the track without; they switch to the usual right-hand running farther west, the line running infrequently enough it can be scheduled. However, a project to build high platforms on both tracks at these stations is currently in design, and all future modernization assumes it will be completed by then; the current pattern is so atypical that what should generalize is the timetable after completion, not the current one.

Worcester Line modernization and timetabling

Modernization of the Worcester Line means, at a minimum, high platforms at all stations and electrification. This is the starting point of everything that follows; while the North American rail network has practically no electrification measured by route-length, the electrified share measured by ridership is fairly high (nearly all ridership in metro New York is on electric lines, for one).

The combination of those two, plus the improvements in reliability that would follow permitting less timetable padding, would make trip times much faster. Where today, locals to Framingham take 58 minutes and expresses to Worcester take 1:26, EMUs would do these trips in 35 and 46 minutes respectively even with infill stations, or maybe slightly more with schedule padding. This would induce higher ridership, requiring higher frequency – not to mention that at stations 15-20 minutes out of Boston, which the Newton stations will be if this is implemented, increasing frequency from a train every 30 minutes to a train every 15 or ideally less would increase ridership in and of itself.

Then, there’s planning for intercity trains beyond Worcester, to Springfield, which is called East-West Rail in Massachusetts. The plans have gotten some funding, but it isn’t enough, and the current plans are still measured in diesel trains per day and not electric trains per hour. But for future planning, we look at space for faster trains, running even faster than Boston-Worcester express trains. Internally in meetings, Devin has come to calling the three patterns local (current locals), local-express (current expresses, so named because they run local between Framingham and Worcester), and Heart-to-Hub (trains running express between Framingham and Worcester, named after a daily express train that got a lot of love from Worcester boosters but not much ridership). The Heart-to-Hub’s ridership was low and therefore its main use is to speed up Boston-Springfield trips. We express frequency in trains per hour at rush hour in both directions, in the order above: 4/4/0 means the local and local-express patterns run every 15 minutes and there are no Heart-to-Hubs, 4/2/2 means the locals run every 15 minutes and the other two run every 30 minutes, etc.

To boost frequency to 4/4/0 or 4/2/2, even with very fast EMU acceleration rates, requires additional infrastructure. The options are to rebuild Framingham from an at-grade two-track station to an elevated four-track station, so that locals could terminate while local-express and Heart-to-Hub trains continue west, and to add a third track in Wellesley (current stops #7-9, the overtake done toward the east). An ongoing plan to triple-track both Wellesley and Natick is budgeted at $400 million, including four station rebuilds; even net of the rebuilds, it’s expensive, and being able to build a shorter triple-track section would save a lot. (Another option is a modified 4/0/4, with the locals running all the way to Worcester; close to 100% of the riders from the local outer-zone stations would transfer at Framingham.)

Anything beyond eight trains per hour requires too much extra infrastructure – at a minimum, both quad-tracking Framingham and triple-tracking Wellesley, and even then the timetable would be fragile. A coherent 4/4/2 pattern would even require an additional passing track around Southborough (stop #14): the issue is that local-express and Heart-to-Hub trains have narrow windows to depart between pairs of local trains, so if there are four local trains per hour and six express trains, then two pairs of express trains have to be closely spaced, forcing an overtake on the outer section even though the speed difference between them is small.

Thankfully, the Worcester Line can live with eight peak trains per hour indefinitely: it’s a doubling over current frequency, and modernization stands to raise ridership by more than that but largely off-peak, as the modal split at rush hour is healthy.

Short-turn trains

Eight trains per hour on the Worcester Line, four running local to Framingham and four running express to Framingham and continuing on to Worcester, is solid. But are there other ways to shove more trains in? This is where the compromises that lead to irregular express patterns become apparent.

The first possibility is to add short-turn trains: those are trains that run short of the outer terminal. Technically, Framingham locals can be thought of as short-turns, but it’s perhaps better to think of Framingham as the outer terminal of local trains, and then conceive of local trains turning short of that. Newton is a good candidate for short-turns: it is on the dense side for an American suburb, it’s close to Boston, and there’s a place for trains to short-turn off the track via a disused connection to Riverside, where the Green Line D branch terminates. But this still doesn’t work, for a subtle reason that generalizes.

The generalization is that instead of the three names for future Worcester Line trains, we will have more patterns, so let’s refer to them by letters. Local trains are L; local trains that turn short are M. Express trains are X (local-express) and Y (Heart-to-Hub), but in the most general case, it’s fine to think in terms of just L, M, and X, since on the inner zone, X and Y make the same stops.

The issue is that X and Y trains still have to fit between L trains or between L and M trains. Under the 4/2/2 option, with Framingham overtakes and no short-turns, outbound departures look roughly as follows:

:00 X
:02 L
:15 Y
:17 L
(Repeat every half hour)

L is allowed to take at most 11 more minutes to get to the overtake point than X/Y, otherwise X/Y have to be slowed down. Under our current assumptions, this is the exact difference. So there’s no space for additional trains unless they turn short, enough that by the time they’d be overtaken mid-line, they’re on the spur to Riverside. This leads to the following principle: if short-turn locals are added to a line with local and express trains, the express train must run behind a short-turn local and not a full-line local. Concretely, where would M short-turns fit? It would look roughly as follows:

:00 X
:02 L
:07 M
:15 Y
:17 L
:22 M
(Repeat every half hour)

This shoves more frequency on the line, which is good for residents of the stations served by M, neutral to slightly bad for everyone else, and costly. The issue is that on the section where M trains run, the operating costs are those of eight local trains per hour, but the maximum gap is not 7.5 but 10 minutes. Moreover, the trains arriving after the longer gap are L trains and not M trains. Thus, the L trains would end up considerably more crowded than the M trains – all passengers traveling beyond the short-turn would be on L and so would two-thirds of the passengers traveling on the short-turn section. Ideally, if there are programmed irregular gaps on a line with short-turn trains, the short-turns should arrive after the longer gap and not after the shorter gap; if L departs :02 and M departs :12, then L takes just one-third of the passengers on the shared section and M takes two-thirds, which manages capacity better. But the presence of X and Y makes this impossible, because X and Y have to run behind M and ahead of L and still have a fairly long gap from M to avoid having to overtake.

Irregular express patterns

Okay, so short-turn trains are not a good way to add capacity to a line with a mix of local and express trains. This leads to the next step: slowing down some express trains, reducing the speed difference between locals and expresses, and compensating by running more express trains serving different stations.

On the Worcester Line, this means running trains in the pattern Y-X-L, with X making more stops to slow it down a little. But this then raises the question of which intermediate stops get to run express.

The New York City Subway standard of having express stops at regular intervals every three to six stations doesn’t work on commuter rail. The subway is designed around four-track trunk lines with cross-platform transfers at express stations, and those work because the trains are very frequent (or, off-peak, used to be). What works for a four-track system that runs local trains every five minutes doesn’t work for a two-track one that runs them every 15. On a commuter rail network, if a station only gets local trains, there is not going to be an opportunity to transfer, not at the scale we’re talking about.

The simplest answer to who gets the express stations is “the busiest stations.” This is a valid answer. Here is the RER B, between Massy-Palaiseau and Cité-Universitaire, the last station within Paris, where all trains make all stops. Off-peak, the southbound stopping patterns include S trains to Robinson on a branch, K trains making all stops to Massy, and P trains running express to Massy and local beyond, each every 15 minutes; at peak, the S is as before, the K skips one stop, there’s an L pattern skipping stops and running local from Massy to Orsay, and the P runs the fastest and is express to Orsay and only local past that, each every 12 minutes.

StationRidershipSP (base)K (rush)L (rush)P (rush)
Cité-U7,531,642*****
Gentilly2,415,990 ****
Laplace3,707,718****
Arcueil-Cachan3,634,116****
Bagneux2,241,461****
Bourg-la-Reine4,446,499*****
Parc de Sceaux574,699*
La Croix de Berny3,161,602****
Antony6,304,424****
Fontaine-Michalon731,635*
Les Baconnets1,860,108 **
Massy-Verrières607,314*
Massy-Palaiseau9,141,486****

There are no overtake locations on the RER B; because of this, the shared trunk to Bourg-la-Reine has to run local at rush hour. The express patterns still run on a regular clockface schedule every 12 minutes at rush hour and every 15 off-peak, but they aren’t neat, due to the density of traffic. The stations that always get served are the busiest ones – Bourg-la-Reine, La Croix de Berny, Antony, Massy – and are an order of magnitude busier than the stations that get skipped the most. This is not an artifact of service – at the distance of those stations from Paris, a train every 12 or 15 minutes is enough for ridership not to depend too much on frequency. There really is much higher demand at Bourg-la-Reine and Massy than at the minor stations.

In contrast, here is ridership per station between Boston Landing and Framingham, on weekdays:

Boston Landing: 479
Newtonville: 429
West Newton: 243
Auburndale: 203
Wellesley Farms: 285
Wellesley Hills: 322
Wellesley Square: 591
Natick: 697
West Natick: 914
Framingham: 995

So, the first thing to notice is that Framingham, the busiest station, has 995 weekday boardings, which is maybe 290,000 per year, which would be by far the least busy on the RER B (the least busy on the entire RATP-run part of the RER is La Hacquinière, on the outer tail of the RER B, with 419,294/year). But also, the spread is much smaller than on the RER B, a factor of about 5 rather than 16. The spread in potential demand is actually larger, since Auburndale and West Newton are close enough to Boston that the hourly frequencies hurt a lot, whereas Framingham and West Natick both are farther away and get much more rush-hour frequency at any case.

A line like the Worcester Line should only even be running express trains in the first place to speed up some outer-zone trips, and with the expectation that Framingham could develop to something bigger. But that brings in the issue of land use in American suburbs.

Land use and commuter rail ridership

I encourage people to compare land use near American and Parisian commuter rail stations. Here is Bourg-la-Reine:

And here is Massy:

These are town centers. Massy is a postwar suburb developed around the train station, with town center development near the station and plenty of later urban renewal as the area got a TGV station. There’s visibly more stuff near Massy or Bourg-la-Reine than near the minor stations on the RER B, in the same way there is more stuff near a major transfer point on most subways than near a station on one line on a tail. They anchor express service.

The land use near American commuter rail stations works differently. It is lower-density, of course, but more importantly, it is uniformly low-density. Density isn’t especially oriented near the train stations. Occasionally there is walkable retail from the train, but it’s not consistent, and there are no clusters of mid-rise buildings with retail and some local office jobs. American suburbanization of residences may follow the train, with gray near the lines and green between them, but suburbanization of jobs never does, instead following highways.

In this context, there’s no real distinguishing feature that allows some stations to get more express service than others. Riders get to the station by car; the fares and schedules don’t allow for integration with suburban buses, and there is no reason for anyone in these suburbs to rely on bikes when all local destinations are auto-centric. The car has a fairly long range within suburbia, and thus riders drive to a better park-and-ride or kiss-and-ride; the busiest suburban American train station, Ronkonkoma, with around 10,000 weekday riders pre-corona, is a parking lot with practically nothing else near it.

What this means is that express trains often generate their own demand, as passengers start driving to them, neglecting other stations. It creates a fiction of lopsided demand with similar ratios between busier and less busy stations as on the RER B, with no underlying reason for it; the Worcester Line has no such ratio, but the LIRR Main Line does, largely due to the park-and-ride effect. Once planners accept that everyone needs an express trains, schedules evolve to be ever more irregular and less reliable, in the search of the perfect express. Caltrain even came up with the push model, in which the scheduler’s job is to push passengers to park-and-rides with open spots, and otherwise there would be no reason to run trains other than the fastest express trains.

This, in turn, guarantees bad service – these irregular patterns repel riders who are not city-bound commuters, and the frequency is never good enough to sustain such patterns off-peak. In the most extreme cases, it can even backfire: the LIRR’s split between Grand Central and Penn Station frequencies has made it so that so far, the East Side Access project has generated zero new ridership. It’s sometimes possible to salvage something: in the case of Framingham and Worcester, both cities have skeletons of bus networks, and coordinated planning could ensure that the buses would be timed with the train and have free transfers. But at most stations, it’s pointless to try to turn them into distinguished nodes beyond the usual for a local train station.

The upshot is that the only way to run coherent timetables is to focus on local trains. Express trains are for express stops, and few places in the suburban United States are worth the effort; Framingham and Worcester are two of those few because of their town center development, but nothing else on the line is.

In that sense, when I harp on the need for high platforms and electrification, it’s not just because these are good practices in and of themselves, but also because they’re necessary for making local service work. Otherwise, the stop penalty kills you: Boston-Worcester is 1:38 on all-local off-peak trains today, which is an average speed of 43 km/h. And nothing except local stretches works in the context of continuous, isotropic suburban density.

We Gave a Talk About New York Commuter Rail Modernization

Blair Lorenzo and I gave the talk yesterday, as advertised. The slide deck was much more in her style than in mine – more pictures, fewer words – so it may not be exactly clear what we said.

Beyond the written report itself (now up in web form, not just a PDF), we talked about some low-hanging fruit. What we’re asking for is not a lot of money – the total capital cost of electrification and high platforms everywhere and the surface bottlenecks we talk about like Hunter Junction is around $6 billion, of which $800 million for Portal Bridge need to happen regardless of anything else; Penn Reconstruction is $7 billion and the eminently cancelable Penn Expansion is $17 billion. However, it is a lot of coordination, of different agencies, of capital and operations, and so on. So it’s useful to talk about how to, in a way, fail gracefully – that is, how to propose something that, if it’s reduced to a pilot program, will still be useful.

The absolute wrong thing to do in a pilot program situation is to just do small things all over, like adding a few midday trains. That would achieve little. There is already alternation between hourly and half-hourly commuter trains in most of the New York region; this doesn’t do much when the subway or a subway + suburban bus combination runs every 10-12 minutes (and should be running every six). The same can be said for CityTicket, which incrementally reduces fares on commuter rail within New York City but doesn’t integrate fares with the subway and therefore produces little ridership increase.

Instead, the right thing to do is focus on one strong corridor. We propose this for phase 1, turning New Brunswick-Stamford or New Brunswick-New Rochelle into a through-line running every 10 minutes all day, as soon as Penn Station Access opens. But there are other alternatives that I think fall into the low-hanging fruit category.

One is the junction fixes, like Hunter as mentioned above (estimated at $300 million), or similar-complexity Shell in New Rochelle, which is most likely necessary for any decent intercity rail upgrade on the Northeast Corridor. It costs money, but not a lot of it by the standards of what’s being funded through federal grants, including BIL money for the Northeast Corridor, which is relevant to both Hunter and Shell.

The other is Queens bus redesign. I hope that as our program at Marron grows, we’ll be able to work on a Queens bus redesign that assumes that it’s possible to connect to the LIRR with fare integration and high frequency; buses would not need to all divert to Flushing or Jamaica, but could run straight north-south, leaving the east-west Manhattan-bound traffic to faster, more efficient trains.

I’m Giving a Talk in New York About Commuter Rail

At the Effective Transit Alliance, we’re about to unveil a report explaining how to modernize New York’s commuter rail system (update 10-31: see link to PDF here). The individual elements should not surprise regular readers of this blog, but we go into more detail about things I haven’t written before about peakiness, and combine everything together to propose some early action items.

To that effect, we will present this in person on Wednesday November 1st, at 1 pm. The event will take place at Marron, in Room 1201 of 370 Jay Street; due to NYU access control, signing up is mandatory using this form, but it can be done anytime until the morning of (or even later, but security will be grumpy). At the minimum, Blair Lorenzo and I will talk about commuter rail and what to do to improve it and take questions from the audience; we intend to be there for two hours, but people can break afterward and still talk, potentially.

Setting Speed Zones

At the Boston meetup two days ago, I was asked about what tools I use to generate timetables, for example for my New York commuter rail posts. The answer is that I use speed zones and then run this code on them – but then the question is how to figure out speed zones. I hope that this sequence of steps will help advocates who are interested in rail modernization.

Generating curve radii

The most difficult element to fix on mainline rail is the right-of-way geometry. Most other things that can restrict a train’s speed can be fixed with more modern maintenance, but right-of-way geometry doesn’t change without physical construction, often in constrained areas – if they weren’t constrained, the curves would have been built wider in the first place.

The best case scenario is that there exist track maps with exact curve radii. I have these for large chunks of the Northeast Corridor, but not all. For example, here is Metro-North (with thanks to The Korot). Curves on such maps are denoted as circles or bumps deviating from a line, with the direction of the circle indicating the direction of the curve’s curvature. On this and other American maps, the radius is listed in degrees, and the cant (see the section below) in inches.

To convert the radius from degrees to more usual units, set one degree to be 1,746 meters, and note that degrees measure curvature and not radius, so a two degree curve has half the radius of a one degree curve. More precisely, the formula is that degrees measure the change in azimuth over 100 feet; 100 feet are 30.48 meters, and converting 30.48 from degrees to radians gives 1,746.37536… meters.

For example, on the Metro-North chart, let’s look at Harrison, New York. It’s on PDF-p. 24 of the chart; Harrison is sandwiched between two curves with opposite orientations, with the platforms on tangent (uncurved) track. The curve just west of Harrison has radius 1° 58′ 30″, which is 884.24069… meters; the curve just east has radius 2° 2′ 15″, which is 857.11674… meters.

Converting curve radii to speeds

The formula for the speed of a train, in SI units, is

\mbox{speed}^{2} = \mbox{radius} \times \mbox{lateral acceleration}

I wrote about lateral acceleration, cant, and cant deficiency two and a half years ago. In short, lateral acceleration, in m/s^2, is the centrifugal force coming from the action of the train rounding the curve at speed. For the purposes of the formula, it is measured in the horizontal plane. To reduce the centrifugal force felt by the passengers (for comfort and safety) as well as that felt by the train body (for safety and maintenance costs), the tracks will typically be banked so that the inner rail is lower than the outer rail, which is called cant or superelevation, and is written in units of distance, such as mm or inches.

The speed of a train on canted track is typically higher than the perfect balancing speed, where the force of gravity counteracts that of centrifugal force; thus, on a fast train there is a residual force pointing to the outside of the train, which can be written down as lateral acceleration in the plane of the tracks (in m/s^2), but is more typically written down in the same units as superelevation, representing the additional superelevation required for the speed to perfectly balance, which is called cant deficiency or underbalance.

The conversion rate between cant (or cant deficiency) is the track gauge measured between the middle of the two rails, divided by the gravitational constant (9.8 m/s^2). Track gauge is typically given as inner rail to inner rail; standard gauge is 1,435 mm inner rail to inner rail. The relevant quantity to superelevation calculations is a few cm more; on standard gauge, it’s taken to be about 1,470-1,500 mm, so the conversion rate is 1 m/s^2 = 150 mm of cant or cant deficiency. The two quantities, cant and cant deficiency, are additive.

The American track charts that I have specify the actual cant. However, the values tend to be too conservative. Again with the example of Harrison, the slightly wider western curve has 5″ cant and the slightly tighter eastern curve has 4.125″ cant. Regulations for maximum cant depend on the country and maintenance standards. The absolute maximum cant I am aware of on any standard-gauge railway is 200 mm on the Tokaido and Tohoku Shinkansen. The reasons not to raise cant further include maintenance difficulties and the risk of a train running at lower speed or even stopping on the track. On lines that are not captive to just high-speed trains, the highest cant I am aware of is 180 mm, in Germany, and this is rare; 160 mm is more common. The American limit is 7″, but frequent inspections are required at that point to ensure that the tracks don’t get bent out of shape to produce higher cant; 8″ is a do-not-exceed level, and in practice track irregularities may lead to exceeding it if there isn’t regular track maintenance.

In practice, raising the cant is usually easy – it can be done with a track geometry machine automatically. However, in one case, it is not: that of S-curves, which have exactly the shape implied by the letter S. Our example of Harrison has two reverse curves in close proximity, but is not an S-curve, as there are hundreds of meters of tangent track between the two curves. Other places do have S-curves, and there, the maximum cant must be lowered somewhat; regulations vary on this, but in Europe, the maximum change in cant is 30-55 mm per second depending on the country (there’s a secondary regulation on mm per meter, but on the Northeast Corridor, the binding rule is mm/s, not mm/m). For example, if we take 45 mm/s, and 180 mm of cant, then it takes four seconds to reverse a curve; note that it is four and not eight, because half of the increase in cant, called a superelevation spiral, is within the curve. Harrison’s current curves impose a hard limit of about 150 km/h, at which point the hundreds of meters of tangent track make it trivially easy to have full superelevation. However, other places, most infamously among Northeastern railfans Elizabeth, there is an actual S-curve, forcing lower cant and lower speeds.

Finally, the maximum cant deficiency depends on the track, the train, and the regulations. Traditionally, American regulations limited most passenger trains to 3″ of cant deficiency, which is ridiculously conservative; in the 2000s, a waiver allowing 5″ in some cases was derided as the “magic high-speed rail waiver” because it applied not just to higher-speed tracks but also to lower-speed lines that had through-service to higher-speed tracks. Since then, FRA regulations have changed, and now the practical limit in the US, with extensive testing, is 6″, or 150 mm cant deficiency, at most speeds. European limits tend to be around 130-150 mm; high-speed trains are at the lower end of this range unless they are tilting trains, which nearly all trains are not. Cant deficiency, like cant, requires its own superelevation spiral on S-curves, but the limits are in practice looser than for cant, and in some cases trains can change superelevation abruptly, with no spiral, for example on switches.

The upshot is that in the typical case, the most aggressive assumption should be 180 mm cant, 150 mm cant deficiency, for a lateral acceleration in the horizontal plane of 2.2 m/s^2. Most lines will not have this pair of aggressive assumptions: 180 mm is only viable when it’s guaranteed that trains will not stop on a canted curve, which is a reasonable assumption on a reliable high-speed line and even on a German high-speed line. Moreover, if there is any freight on the line, superelevation must fall drastically: slower trains would be at cant excess, and freight trains have high center of mass (diesel locomotives and double-stacked containers both have higher center of mass than electric passenger trains) and therefore have tight cant excess limits. Aggressive assumptions are viable on the Northeast Corridor and on controllable commuter lines with no or almost no freight, such as the LIRR, but not everywhere else.

Finding curve radii

In some cases, curve radii are spelled out in a chart. In others, they are not, and must be figured out. Our program’s schedule writer, Devin Wilkins, tells me she has just found a track chart for SEPTA, but otherwise, I have no such charts south of New York. There, the dirty, imperfect method of estimating curve radii must be used.

For that, I use Google Earth. Nowadays, Google Earth Pro is free, and comes with a circle tool. In theory, I can fidget with the radius of a circle until I find that it approximates the arc of a curve well. This requires paying special attention to how the drawn curve compares with not just the broad outline of the curve but also the exact arc of each track or even each rail: the drawn curve should be at the same relative position to the rails, such as following one rail of one track, or right in the center of one track, or right between the track centers, and so on.

In cases of uncertainty, it’s also possible to use Google Earth line tools, which state the azimuth of each line. If I can find the exact start and end points of each curve, and the azimuths of the tangents on both side, then I can draw the chord with a line tool, verifying that its azimuth is the exact arithmetic mean of the azimuths of the two tangents; if it is not the mean, then either I made an error (more likely) or the curve is not a perfect circle (possible but less likely). The radius of the curve is approximately the length of the chord times 180/pi divided by change in azimuth; more precisely, the radius is

\mbox{chord length}/(2 \times \arcsin(\mbox{difference in azimuth})/2).

This method is error-prone, especially for short, sharp curves. Computing the start and end points of the curve will always have errors, and if the change in azimuth is small, then these will lead to large errors. The circle tool method suffers from the same drawback: it’s easier to use it to estimate the radius of a curve with 60 degree change in azimuth than that of one with 10 degree change.

Over time I’ve gotten this method down to the point that my errors from what I later find with track charts such as that of Metro-North are fairly small, and not very biased in the larger-radius direction. But it takes time and practice and ideally you should avoid it for short, sharp curves.

Update 10-28: Ari Ofsevit has a third method, using chord lines.

Other speed limits

Speed limits on intercity trains mostly come from curves. But there are other things to keep in mind, not all of which are fixable:

  • Tunnels increase air resistance to the point that unless the tunnels are constructed with large enough radius to have a lot of free air (modern tunnels are, legacy ones aren’t), or unless the trains are pressurized, the speed limit has to be lower just to avoid popping passengers’ ears at entry and exit.
  • Switches generally have low speed limits – they have tight curves and no superelevation – making all complex junctions and major stations slow.
  • Terminal stations have another set of speed limits coming from the bumper tracks. American limits are very conservative – 10 mph where a ramp down from 40 or 50 km/h is more normal in Europe – but even 50 km/h is not 200 km/h.
  • Some pieces of infrastructure are so shoddy that they limit the dynamical axle load of the train, which is derived from both static axle load, which is a function of train mass, and speed. As usual, American limits on this are conservative, assuming high static axle load and fixing a low speed on some very old bridges, instead of permitting lighter trains to run faster. But it is sometimes a real problem.

I’m Giving a Talk About Regional Rail in Boston

I haven’t been as active here lately; I think people know why and ask that you find other things to comment on.

I’m in Boston this week (and in New York next week), meeting with friends and TransitMatters people; in particular, I’m giving a talk at the Elephant and Castle on Wednesday at 6 pm to discuss regional rail and related reforms for Boston:

What I keep finding on these trips is that public transportation in the US is always worse than I remember. In Boston, I had a short wait on the Red Line from South Station to where I’m staying in Cambridge, but the next train was 13 minutes afterward, midday on a weekday. The trip from South Station to Porter Square took 24 minutes over a distance of 7.7 km covering seven stops; TransitMatters has a slow zone dashboard, there are so many. A line segment with an interstation a little longer than a kilometer has a lower average speed than any Paris Métro line, even those with 400 meter interstations; in Berlin, which averages 780 meters, the average speed is 30 km/h.

In New York, the frequency is okay, but there’s a new distraction: subway announcements now say “we have over 100 accessible stations,” giving no information except advertising that the MTA hates disabled people and thinks that only 30% of the system should be accessible to wheelchair users. There are still billboards on the subway advertising OMNY, a strictly inferior way of paying for the system than the older prepaid cards – it’s a weekly cap at the same rate as the unlimited weekly, but it’s only available Monday to Sunday rather than in any seven-day period (update 10-24: I’m told it’s fixed and now it’s exactly the same product as prepaying if you know you’ll hit the cap), and the monthly fare is still just a bit cheaper than getting weeklies or weekly caps.

Our Webinar, and Penn Reconstruction

Our webinar about the train station 3D model went off successfully. I was on video for a little more than two hours, Michael a little less; the recording is on YouTube, and I can upload the auto-captioning if people are okay with some truly bad subtitles.

I might even do more webinars as a substitute for Twitch streams, just because Zoom samples video at similar quality to Twitch for my purposes but at far smaller file size; every time I upload a Zoom video I’m reminded that it takes half an hour to upload a two-hour video whereas on Twitch it is two hours when I’m in Germany. (Internet service in other countries I visit is much better.)

The questions, as expected, were mostly not about the 3D model, but about through-running and Penn Station in general. Joe Clift was asking a bunch of questions about the Hudson Tunnel Project (HTP) and its own issues, and he and others were asking about commuter rail frequency. A lot of what we talked about is a preview of a long proposal, currently 19,000, by the Effective Transit Alliance; the short version can be found here. For example, I briefly mentioned on video that Penn Expansion, the plan to demolish a Manhattan block south of Penn Station to add more tracks at a cost of $17 billion, provides no benefits whatsoever, even if it doesn’t incorporate through-running. The explanation is that the required capacity can be accommodated on four to five tracks with best American practices for train turnaround times and with average non-US practices, 10 minutes to turn; the LIRR and New Jersey Transit think they need 18-22 minutes.

There weren’t questions about Penn Reconstruction, the separate (and much better) $7 billion plan to rebuild the station in place. The plan is not bad – it includes extra staircases and escalators, extra space on the lower concourse, and extra exits. But Reinvent Albany just found an agreement between the various users of Penn Station for how to do Penn Reconstruction, and it enshrines some really bad practices: heavy use of consultants, and a choice of one of four project delivery methods all of which involve privatization of the state; state-built construction is not on the menu.

In light of that, it may make sense to delay Penn Reconstruction. The plan as it is locks in bad procurement practices, which mean the costs are necessarily going to be a multiple of what they could be. It’s better to expand in-house construction capacity for the HTP and then deploy it for other projects as the agency gains expertise; France is doing this with Grand Paris Express, using its delivery vehicle Société du Grand Paris as the agency for building RER systems in secondary French cities, rather than letting the accumulated state capacity dissipate when Grand Paris Express is done.

This is separate from the issue of what to even do about Penn Station – Reconstruction in effect snipes all the reimaginings, not just ours but also ones that got more established traction like Vishaan Chakrabarti’s. But even then it’s not necessarily a bad project; it just really isn’t worth $7 billion, and the agreement makes it clear that it is possible to do better if the agencies in question learn what good procurement practices are (which I doubt – the MTA is very bought in to design-build failure).

Different Models of Partial Through-Running

I gave a very well-attended webinar talk a few hours ago, in which a minority of the time was spent on the 3D model and a majority about through-running and related modernization elements for commuter rail. I will talk more about it when the video finishes uploading, which will take hours in the queue. But for now, I’d like to talk about different conceptions of how through-running should work. I was asked what the difference is between my vision (really our vision at ETA, including that of people who disagree with me on a lot of specifics) and the vision of Tri-State and ReThink.

One difference is that I think a Penn Station-Grand Central connection is prudent and they don’t, but it’s at the level of detail. The biggest difference is how to react to a situation where there isn’t enough core capacity to run every line through. Tri-State and ReThink prefer connecting as many lines as possible to the through-running trunk; I prefer only connecting lines insofar as they can run frequently and without interference with non-through-running lines.

Partial through-running

To run everything in New York through, it’s necessary to build about six different lines. My standard six-line map can be seen here, with Line 7 (colored turquoise) removed; note that Line 7’s New Jersey branches don’t currently run any passenger service, and its Long Island branches could just be connected to Line 5 (dark yellow). The question is what to do when there are no six through-lines but only two or three. Right now, there is only one plausible through-line; the Gateway tunnel/Hudson Tunnel Project would add a second, if it included some extra infrastructure (like the Grand Central connection); the realigned Empire Connection could be a third. Anything else is a from-scratch project; any plan has to assume no more than two or three lines.

The question is what to do afterward. I am inspired by the RER, which began with a handful of branches, on which it ran intense service. For example, here is Paris in 1985, at which point it had the RER A, B, and C, but no D yet: observe that there were still large terminating networks at the largest train stations, including some lines that weren’t even frequent enough to be depicted – the RER D system out of Gare de Lyon visible starting 1995 took over a preexisting line that until then missed the map’s 20-minute midday frequency cutoff.

The upshot that whenever I depict a three-line New York commuter rail system, it leaves out large portions of the system; those terminate at Grand Central (without running through to Penn Station), Brooklyn, or Hoboken. The point is to leverage existing lines and run service intensely, for example every 10 minutes per branch (or every 20 on outer tails, but the underlying branches should be every 10).

Tri-State uses a map of the RER in its above-linked writeup, but doesn’t work this way. Instead, it depicts a trunk line from Secaucus to Penn Station to Sunnyside with branches in a few directions. ReThink is clearer about what it’s doing and is depicting every possible branch connecting to the trunk, even the Hudson and Harlem Lines, via a rebuilt connection to the Hell Gate Bridge.

The issue of separation

The other issue for me – and this is a long-term disagreement I have with some other really sharp people at ETA – is the importance of separating through- from terminating lines. Paris has almost total segregation between RER and terminating Transilien trains; on the most important parts of the network, the RER A and B, there is only track sharing on one branch of the RER A (with Transilien L to Saint-Lazare), and only at rush hour. London likewise uses Crossrail/Elizabeth Line trains to connect to the slow lines of the Great Eastern and Great Western Main Lines, more or less leaving the fast lines for terminating trains. Berlin has practically no track sharing between the S-Bahn and anything else, just one short branch section.

With no contiguous four-track lines, New York can’t so segregate services while keeping to the Parisian norm that shorter-range lines run through and longer-range ones terminate. Any such scheme would necessarily involve extensive sharing of trunk tunnels between terminating and through trains, which would make Penn Station’s schedules even more fragile than they are today.

This means that New York is compelled to run through at fairly long range. For example, trains should be running through on the Northeast Corridor all the way to Trenton fairly early, and probably also all the way to New Haven. This makes a lot of otherwise-sympathetic agency planners nervous; they get the point about metro-like service at the range of Newark, Elizabeth, and New Rochelle, but assume that farther-out suburbs would only see demand to Manhattan and only at rush hour. I don’t think that this nervousness is justified – the outer anchors see traffic all day, every day (New Haven is, at least on numbers from the 2010s, the busiest station in the region on weekends, edging out Stamford and Ronkonkoma). But I get where it’s coming from. It’s just a necessary byproduct of running a system in which some entire lines run through and other entire lines do not.

On the New Jersey side, this compels a setup in which the Northeast Corridor and North Jersey Coast Line run through, even all the way to the end. The Morris and Essex Lines and the Montclair-Boonton Line would then be running to the Gateway tunnel, running through if the tunnel connected to Grand Central or anything else to the east. The Raritan Valley Line can terminate at Newark with a transfer, or be shoehorned into either the Northeast Corridor (easier infrastructure) or Morris and Essex system (more spare capacity) if extensive infrastructure is built to accommodate this. The Erie lines, planned to have an awkward loop at Secaucus, should just keep terminating at Hoboken until there’s money for a dedicated tunnel for them – they’re already perfectly separated from the Northeast Corridor and tie-ins, and can stay separate.

On the LIRR side, this means designating different lines to run to Penn Station or Grand Central, and set up easy connections at Jamaica or a future Sunnyside Junction station. I like sending the LIRR Main Line to Grand Central, the Atlantic lines (Far Rockaway and Long Beach) to Brooklyn, the Port Washington Branch to the same trunk as the Northeast Corridor, and the remaining lines to the northern East River Tunnel pair (with Empire Connection through-running eventually), but there are other ways of setting it up. Note here that the line that through-runs to New Jersey, Port Washington, is the one that’s most separated from the rest of the system, which means there is no direct service from New Jersey to Jamaica, only to Flushing; this is a cost, but it balances against much more robust rail service, without programmed conflicts between trains.

And on the Metro-North side, it means that anything that isn’t already linked to a through-line goes to Grand Central and ends there. I presume the New Haven Line would be running through either via Grand Central or via the Hell Gate Line, the Harlem Line would terminate, and the Hudson Line depends on whether the Empire Connection is built or not; as usual, there are other ways to set this up, and the tradeoff is that the Harlem Line is the most local in the Bronx whereas the New Haven Line already has to interface with through-running so might as well shoehorn everything there into the system.

I’m Giving a Webinar Talk About Penn Station

The model that I’ve been blogging about is going to be the subject of a Zoom webinar, on Thursday 9-28, at 19:00 Berlin time or 13:00 New York time.

The talk will be in conversation with New York Daily News reporter and editor Michael Aronson, who has been very passionate in private conversations with us about improving rail service in the area and criticizing poor project management and high costs. In particular, he may yet save the Gateway Project three years, advancing capacity that much faster.

Specifically, the issue is that the existing tunnels between New Jersey and New York, the North River Tunnels, were heavily damaged in Hurricane Sandy, and require long-term repairs. The preferred alternative is long-term shutdowns of one track at a time, which is not possible until the Gateway tunnel (the Hudson Tunnel Project) is completed and would take a total of three years across both tracks then. The alternative is to do those repairs during weekend shutdowns. It is commonly believed that already there is repair work every weekend, and the timetables through the tunnel are written with the assumption that traffic can fit on a single track every weekend, giving a 55-hour shutdown period once a week. However, Michael found out that over a four-year period ending in 2020, the full shutdown for repairs was only done 13 times, or once every three months, and most of those shutdowns were not for repairing the tunnels themselves; in the following year, no shutdowns were done due to corona, and subsequently, the sluggish pre-corona rate has continued. If the repairs are done every weekend as the timetable permits, then it should be possible to wrap up simultaneously with the completion of the new tunnel, saving those three years of shutdown.